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Abstract
In this paper, we compare option contracts from a traditional derivatives exchange to bank-
issued options, also referred to as covered warrants, whose markets have grown rapidly around the
world in recent years. While bank-issued option markets and traditional derivatives exchanges exhibit
signiﬁcant structural diﬀerences such as the absence of a central counterparty for bank-issued options,
they frequently exist side-by-side, and the empirical evidence shows that there is signiﬁcant overlap
in their product oﬀerings. We examine trading costs and liquidity in both markets and ﬁnd that
bank-issued options have smaller quoted percentage bid-ask spreads than traditional option contracts
by an average of 4.3%. The bid-ask spread diﬀerence manifests itself in a highly regular fashion in
that ask (bid) prices for bank-issued options are consistently higher than comparable ask (bid) prices
for traditional option contracts. The diﬀerence of the bid prices is larger than the diﬀerence of the
ask prices resulting in smaller bid-ask spreads for bank-issued options. The empirical analysis also
indicates that bid-ask spreads in either market are lowered by competition from the other market. We
present a potential explanation for the co-existence of the two market structures which suggests that
the bank-issued option market caters more towards retail investors with predominantly speculative
motives while traditional derivatives exchanges may cater more towards institutional investors with
predominantly hedging motives.
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Well-functioning ﬁnancial markets are of considerable importance for resource allocation and risk
transfer and thereby the overall welfare of an economy. Finance practitioners as well as regulators
thus pay considerable attention to the structure of existing ﬁnancial markets and the design of newly-
developing ﬁnancial markets. In the area of derivatives markets, one of the biggest success stories in
recent years has been the growth in markets around the world for bank-issued options, also sometimes
referred to as covered warrants. Bank-issued options are exchange-traded, securitized options issued
by banks and other ﬁnancial institutions. The options are non-standardized, and individual issuers
are free to choose any option characteristics for which they expect investor demand. Each issuer is
the sole counterparty to its own option contracts.1 However, issuers compete by issuing similar or
identical options and usually obligate themselves to serve as market makers for their own products
on an organized exchange. For investors, bank-issued option markets represent an alternative to
traditional derivatives exchanges such as the CBOE, and trading activity in bank-issued options is
frequently of considerable magnitude compared to trading activity in option contracts from traditional
exchanges. It is thus important and useful to study these alternative market structures.
While bank-issued option markets and traditional option exchanges exhibit signiﬁcant struc-
tural and institutional diﬀerences, they frequently exist side-by-side oﬀering many options with iden-
tical or similar characteristics. This study provides the ﬁrst comprehensive empirical comparison
of bank-issued options to option contracts from a traditional derivatives exchange. We analyze the
characteristics of options oﬀered in both market types and assess the degree of overlap between the
markets. Secondly, we compare liquidity provision under the two market structures and examine
how it is aﬀected by competition within and between the markets. Liquidity provision is mainly
assessed using bid and ask quotes and the resulting quoted bid-ask spreads, but we also analyze
other dimensions/measures of liquidity such as eﬀective spreads, minimum trade sizes, maximum
bid-ask spreads, and brokerage costs. Finally, we also ask why and how such diﬀerently organized
markets for similar or identical ﬁnancial assets can co-exist successfully rather than consolidate into
one market structure.
1 Since each issuer is the sole counterparty, options are not exchangeable between issuers or
between the bank-issued market and a traditional derivatives exchange in the sense that an option
position entered into with a particular issuer cannot be liquidated with another issuer or on the
derivatives exchange. Furthermore, arbitrage between issuers and market types is restricted by the
fact that investors cannot write bank-issued options, thereby imposing a short-sale constraint.
1The empirical evidence shows that there is considerable overlap in the product oﬀerings between
the two market types. For our sample, options in both markets with identical or very similar features
for just six heavily traded underlying assets account for roughly one quarter of the total equity and
equity index option trading volume in either market. With respect to liquidity provision, bank-issued
options have signiﬁcantly smaller quoted percentage bid-ask spreads by an average of 4.3%. The bid-
ask spread diﬀerence between the two market types manifests itself in a highly regular fashion in that
ask prices for bank-issued options are consistently higher than comparable ask prices for traditional
option contracts. At the same time, bank-issued option bid prices are consistently higher than the
comparable bid prices from the traditional exchange. The diﬀerence of the bid prices is larger than
the diﬀerence of the ask prices resulting in smaller bid-ask spreads for bank-issued options.
D e s p i t et h ea bo v ed i ﬀerences in liquidity provision, we also present evidence that bid-ask spreads
in either market are lowered by competition from the other market. This ﬁnding is broadly consistent
with related work by Battalio, Hatch, and Jennings (2003), De Fountnouvelle, Fishe, and Harris
(2003), Mayhew (2002), and Wang (2000) examining the eﬀect of competition among traditional
option exchanges on liquidity and market-making quality. The multivariate analysis shows that
competition among issuers within the bank-issued option market also beneﬁts investors via more
competitive quotes. Furthermore, we provide evidence of a trade-oﬀ between quote competitiveness
and other market-making features consistent with theoretical work such as Hodrick and Moulton
(2003) which is based on the notion that liquidity is multi-dimensional. Finally, we present a potential
explanation for the co-existence of the two market structures which suggests that the bank-issued
option market caters more towards retail investors with predominantly speculative motives while
traditional derivatives exchanges may cater more towards institutional investors with predominantly
hedging motives.2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the structural
and institutional features of bank-issued option markets in more detail. Data and methodology are
discussed in Section 3. Section 4 gives the empirical evidence, containing univariate and multivari-
ate comparisons of quotes and spreads in both markets, robustness checks, and univariate analyses
assessing the eﬀect of competition between the two market types. Section 5 concludes.
2 In related work, Franke, Stapleton, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Leisen and Judd (2000), and
Franke and Weber (2002) study how investor heterogeneity can give rise to option supply and
demand. However, these studies do not connect option clienteles, such as hedgers and speculators,
to market design and microstructure issues.
22. Market Structures of Bank-Issued Options vs. Option Contracts on
Derivatives Exchanges
Many European and Asian countries have sizable markets of options also referred to as covered war-
rants that are issued by banks as stand-alone securities. These bank-issued options are traded on
organized exchanges, such as the European Warrant Exchange (EuWax) in Germany, the NextWar-
rants segment of Euronext, the extraMARK segment of the London Stock Exchange, the MCW
segment of the Borsa Italiana in Milan, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, or the Australian Stock
Exchange. Bank-issued option markets are thus diﬀerent from warrant markets in the U.S., where
the term warrant typically refers to option securities written on an issuing corporation’s own stock.
Such U.S. warrants are originally issued in a bundle with another security, e.g. a corporate bond,
but can subsequently be traded separately.
Almost all bank-issued options are covered options in the sense that the issuer is obligated (as
stated in the prospectus) to hedge all options sold. Thus, bank-issued options are generally considered
to be free of default risk. In the prospectus, issuers often also commit to make a market for their
own options by quoting ask and bid prices on at least one exchange or electronic information system,
such as Reuters, until the option’s expiration. The quality of the market-making is usually further
detailed by providing a maximum bid-ask spread, minimum quote depth, and minimum trade size
as, for example, in Goldman Sachs (2000). Investors can purchase bank-issued options using regular
brokerage accounts, with orders being ﬁlled either on an exchange listing the desired option or directly
with the issuer as an over-the-counter transaction. It is typically not possible for investors to write
bank-issued options which is equivalent to the investor shorting the option.
In addition to competition among issuing banks in the bank-issued option market itself, there
are several cases in which bank-issued option markets exist side-by-side with traditional derivatives
exchanges, often oﬀering options with identical or very similar payoﬀ functions. Examples of both
markets existing side-by-side are found in Italy, where the MCW market, for bank-issued options,
and the IDEM market, for option exchange contracts, even exist as segments on the same exchange,
and Germany, where bank-issued options are traded on the aforementioned EuWax exchange and
traditional option contracts are traded on the EuRex derivatives exchange in Frankfurt.
While precise data for all bank-issued option markets around the world are diﬃcult to obtain,
the German bank-issued option market being studied in this paper is generally considered to be the
world’s largest. The International Warrant Institute (2002), an industry association, estimates that
in the year 2000 roughly half of the global bank-issued option trading volume as measured by paid
premiums occurred in Germany. EuWax in turn dominates the German bank-issued option market
3with a market share of over 90% according to B¨ orse Stuttgart (2001). For equity and equity index
options, year 2000 EuWax trading volume as measured by paid premiums represents roughly 30% of
year 2000 EuRex trading volume. Thus, compared both to EuRex, its traditional derivatives exchange
counterpart, and to other international option exchanges, the EuWax market is of considerable size.
Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that the trading volume of EuWax options on the largest
underlying asset, the German DAX index, would rank among the top ﬁve underlying assets on the
C B O Ed u r i n gt h es a m et i m ep e r i o d .
EuWax is a special market segment of the Stuttgart Stock Exchange, one of Germany’s regional
stock exchanges. Issuers listing EuWax options are required to make a continuous market for their
options and are subject to quality control and regulation from the exchange. EuWax orders can
potentially be placed with any ﬁnancial institution willing to make a market. However, discussions
with market participants indicate that market-making by someone other than the issuer is rare and
that orders are ﬁlled almost exclusively with the issuer’s market maker. All major issuers of bank-
issued options in Germany make markets for their own options on EuWax.3 Bank-issued options in
Germany are subject to relatively little regulation, and as a result, banks can issue options quickly
and at low cost.4 Regulatory diﬀerences could be one of the reasons why bank-issued option markets
are virtually non-existent in the U.S. while having experienced tremendous growth in many other
countries. In the U.S., bank-issued options fall under the Commodity Exchange Act and are subject
to regulation by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission while in other countries bank-issued
options are often subject to less onerous general banking supervision.
EuRex ranks by most measures as the world’s largest derivatives exchange and has many typi-
cal derivatives exchange characteristics comparable to the CBOE. Option contracts are standardized
with respect to underlying asset, exercise style, expiration date, and strike price, and new contracts
are created according to speciﬁc rules governing, for example, the addition of strike prices and new
expiration dates. There are pairs of calls and puts for all option contracts. EuRex Clearing AG, a
wholly owned subsidiary of EuRex, serves as the central counterparty and clearinghouse for all con-
tracts. EuRex has market makers who are obligated to supply bid and ask quotes and to enter into
transactions upon demand generated by an order. There are exchange-mandated maximum bid-ask
3 According to B¨ orse Stuttgart (2002), major issuers are BNP Paribas, Citibank, Commerzbank,
Credit Lyonnais, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC Trinkaus Burkhardt,
HypoVereinsbank, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Rabobank, Salomon Brothers (now part of
Citibank), Sal. Oppenheim, Societe Generale, UBS Warburg, Unicredito Italiano, and WestLB.
4 Discussions with Sal. Oppenheim in Germany indicate that the regulatory process for new
bank-issued options in Germany typically takes less than a week, and has direct costs of only a few
thousand Euros. New issues are typically advertised in the business press and via electronic media,
which creates additional issuance costs.
4spreads, minimum quote depths, and a minimum period for maintaining quotes. Most option con-
tracts have several competing market makers whose parent institutions in some cases are banks that
also issue EuWax options as shown in EuRex Communications (1999) and EuRex Communications
(2002a).
A summary of institutional diﬀerences between EuRex and EuWax is provided in Table 1.T h e
fact that such markedly diﬀerent market structures for options can exist side-by-side while oﬀering
products that appear in many regards as substitutes raises the question of the raison d’ˆ etre of the
diﬀerent markets. Common wisdom among market practitioners suggests that bank-issued option
markets are geared towards retail investors while traditional derivatives exchanges cater more to
the needs of institutional investors. The idea of diﬀering clienteles between the two market types
is supported by the fact that minimum trade sizes of EuWax options are considerably smaller than
the minimum trades sizes of otherwise comparable EuRex options.5 Furthermore, conversations with
option market professionals at Sal. Oppenheim, Citibank, OnVista, EuWax and EuRex also support
the notion that the two clienteles diﬀer with respect to their motives for using options. Retail investors
on EuWax are perceived typically to have speculative motives, while the typical institutional investor
on EuRex is more likely engaged in hedging.
Several stylized facts are consistent with the idea that EuWax and EuRex clienteles may also
diﬀer with respect to speculative versus hedging motives. First, EuWax issuers provide many more
calls than puts at a rate of roughly ﬁve to one, which does not appear to cater to investors with
hedging demands, who are typically long in the underlying asset and thus need to buy put options
rather than call options. Institutional investors with on-going hedging programs may also prefer the
EuRex market due to its superior predictability with respect to the availability of particular contracts
in the future, which is governed by detailed rules for EuRex options, while EuWax issuers are under
no obligation to issue particular types of options in the future.
While it is not possible to assess clientele diﬀerences directly due to the unavailability of EuWax
and EuRex data identifying the speciﬁc counterparties and their option positions, one can look
at potential diﬀerences between hedgers and speculators with respect to how derivatives are used
w h i c hi nt u r nm a ya ﬀect trades and quotes which are observed in the available data. One such
diﬀerence is that hedgers with on-going hedging programs may be more likely to hold option positions
until maturity, while speculators are more likely to liquidate option positions early once the event
corresponding to the investor’s speculative information is realized. As a result there may be a relation
b e t w e e na no p t i o ni n v e s t o r ’ se x p e c t e dh o l d i n gp e r i o da n dh i sc h o i c eo fm a r k e t / l i q u i d i t yp r o v i d e r .
5 EuRex minimum trade sizes are on average approximately 40 times larger than the EuWax
minimum trade sizes in our sample.
5The potential relation is based on a fundamental diﬀerence between many primary markets, such as
stock markets, and derivative securities markets. This diﬀerence lies in the fact that by holding a
derivative security until maturity, investors can convert it into cash without requiring the liquidity
services of a dealer. Buyers with a high probability of holding a derivative security until maturity
may thus be less concerned with bid-ask spreads than investors in primary assets such as stocks. The
former essentially face only one-way transaction costs rather than the round-trip transaction costs
faced by the latter. Given a choice between two option markets, investors with a high probability
of holding the option until maturity are best served buying options in the market exhibiting the
lowest ask prices irrespective of the magnitude of the bid-ask spread. On the other hand, investors
with a high probability of liquidating the option position before maturity may be willing to buy a
more expensive option if they expect to recover the initial ask price diﬀerence via an even higher bid
price diﬀerence later on.6 The idea that expected future transaction costs aﬀect investors’ current
d e c i s i o n si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t hﬁndings by Goldreich, Hanke, and Nath (2003) showing that current
liquidity premiums of U.S. Treasury securities are related to measures of expected future liquidity.
Figure 1 illustrates that, all else equal, an investor’s willingness to buy a more expensive option
today should increase with the expected value of the future bid price diﬀerence and with the prob-
ability of early liquidation. Furthermore, the expected future bid price diﬀerence should be higher
than today’s ask price diﬀerence. This is due to two eﬀects. First, the future bid price diﬀerence
is reduced by the time value of money. Secondly, the expected bid price diﬀerence is earned only
with the probability of early liquidation, which can be less than one, while the ask price diﬀerence is
incurred with certainty, if the more expensive option is purchased today. A bid price diﬀerence which
is smaller than the ask price diﬀerence implies that bid-ask spreads are smaller in the market with
higher prices. Given that investors with speculative motives should be more concerned with bid-ask
spreads than investors with hedging motives, an option market catering primarily to investors with
speculative motives should exhibit consistently higher ask and bid prices and smaller bid-ask spreads
than a market catering primarily to investors with hedging motives. In addition, investors with a
high likelihood of early liquidation should also pay more attention to other features of market-making
quality aﬀecting expected round-trip transaction costs such as guaranteed maximum bid-ask spreads,
which the issuer can trade oﬀ with quote competitiveness. The appendix gives a formal presenta-
tion of the above clientele argument and shows how an implied measure of the probability of early
liquidation can be recovered from observed bid and ask quotes.
6 Similar clientele eﬀects may exist in bond markets as bonds held until maturity incur only
one-way transaction costs while bonds sold before maturity incur round-trip transaction costs.
6The EuWax market structure appears to support catering to clients with a high probability
of early liquidation. In particular, due to the absence of a central counterparty, EuWax options
from diﬀerent issuers are not exchangeable. Given that the issuer is also the primary market maker,
EuWax issuers can compete based on expected round-trip transaction costs which are determined by
contemporaneous ask prices and future bid prices. As argued above, investors with a high probability
of early liquidation may be willing to pay a higher ask price today at the beneﬁt of a higher bid price
in the future. Thus, EuWax issuers with a reputation for high bid prices are compensated by being
able to charge higher ask prices.7 EuRex investors on the other hand are indiﬀerent as to which
market maker initially sells them an option, since it can be sold back to any other market maker
in the future due to the fact that EuRex options have a central counterparty. Thus, EuRex market
makers compete on contemporaneous prices alone, since a EuRex market maker oﬀering consistently
high bid prices is not rewarded by being able to charge consistently high ask prices. Finally, it is
interesting to note that it is not necessary for the bid-ask quotes in the two markets to overlap as
depicted in Figure 1. The EuWax short-sale constraint prevents arbitrage in a situation in which
EuWax bid prices are higher than EuRex ask prices. This latter case is depicted in Figure 2. The
appendix gives a formal presentation of the relation between short-sale constraint and no-arbitrage
conditions.
3. Data and Methodology
3.1. Data
We obtain data on the characteristics of all EuRex and EuWax equity options and equity index
options (hereafter referred to as index options) which existed during the period from May 1, 1999,
until October 31, 2001. These characteristics are: underlying asset, type (call or put), exercise style
(American or European), strike price, expiration date, and contract size (in units of the underlying
asset) for both EuWax and EuRex options, as well as the issuing bank for EuWax options. The
EuWax data are obtained from the EuWax exchange and OnVista AG, a commercial provider of
ﬁnancial data with a particular focus on EuWax options, who in turn obtain the data directly from the
issuers.8 OnVista also provides monthly trading volume statistics for each EuWax option, measured
7 Since issuers are the sole counterparty to their options, investors are “captive” in the sense that
the issuer could exploit them by oﬀering very poor bid prices once a suﬃcient quantity of options
are sold. However, such behavior will damage the issuer’s reputation for future transactions and
thus is unlikely to be optimal in a dynamic setting.
8 Since all EuWax options are assigned the German equivalent of a CUSIP number, we can merge
7by the number of contracts traded and the paid premiums. In addition, we obtain a complete history
of year 2000 bid and ask quotes for all EuWax options from the EuWax exchange. The quotes are
recorded directly from the issuing bank’s market maker via EuWax’s electronic limit-control-system.
All quotes are time-stamped to the nearest second.9
The EuRex option data, which are obtained directly from EuRex, contain a complete record
of all EuRex transactions during the sample period. In addition to the option characteristics, these
data also contain the number of contracts traded and the transaction price. Thus, volume data
comparable to the EuWax volume data can be calculated from the EuRex transactions data.10 For
EuRex options, year 2000 quotes are obtained from the capital markets database (KKMDB) at the
University of Karlsruhe. The KKMDB data is recorded directly from the electronic trading system at
the EuRex exchange. KKMDB quotes are time-stamped to one-hundredth of a second. Each record
contains the best bid quote and the best ask quote, which are not necessarily from the same market
maker out of the set of competing EuRex market makers.
3.2. Overview of Market Activity on EuRex and EuWax
Total volume as measured by paid premiums of all EuRex equity and index options during the year
2000 is 78.3 billion Euros. The comparable number for EuWax options is 22.4 billion Euros. Thus,
the size of the EuWax market as measured by paid premiums is approximately 30% of the size of the
EuRex market.11 By deﬁnition, the notional volume of underlying assets represented by transactions
in each market is signiﬁcantly larger than the paid premiums. For EuRex equity options the ratio
of notional volume to paid premiums is roughly ten-to-one. Hereafter volume always refers to paid
premiums and total volume always refers to the sum of equity and equity index option volume unless
indicated otherwise. As shown in Table 2, there are 37,248 diﬀerent EuWax equity and index options,
where options with identical characteristics but from diﬀerent issuers are counted individually, and
67,577 diﬀerent EuRex equity and index options. EuRex and EuWax option oﬀerings diﬀer in several
and compare the two data sources. In a very small number of cases (less than 1%) in which the two
sources disagree, we verify the correct information directly from the issuer web site (virtually all
EuWax issuers maintain web sites containing detailed information regarding their own options).
9 The EuWax data do not contain information on open interest which is unfortunate since it would
allow additional tests of diﬀerences in holding periods between investors in the two markets, in the
sense that, ceteris paribus, EuWax options should exhibit lower open interest at maturity.
10 To check for accuracy, we aggregate the EuRex volume data for each underlying and compare
them to the volume statistics published in the EuRex annual and monthly reports in EuRex
Communications (2002b). In all cases the numbers aggregated from the transactions record are
within less than 0.1% of the published number.
11 While the ratio of trading volume in the two markets exhibits some variation over the months in
the sample, there is no discernible trend.
8ways. EuWax options are typically long-dated with average maturities of about 450 and 400 days
for calls and puts, respectively, while the average maturity for EuRex options is about 150 days.
EuWax options are predominantly American style, while index options on EuRex are European style
and equity options are American style. There are about ﬁv et i m e sa sm a n yc a l lo p t i o n s( 3 1,116)
on EuWax as put options (6,132), while these are always issued in pairs on EuRex. EuWax oﬀers
a much larger scope of underlying assets (828 for calls and 431 for puts) compared to EuRex (128
for calls and puts). In addition to domestic blue chip stocks and major indices, which represent the
majority of underlying assets on EuRex, underlying assets on EuWax also include a large number of
foreign stocks, small-cap and mid-cap stocks, and sub-indices. While not part of the sample, there is
also a great variety of interest-rate options and currency options on EuWax. Although the number
of diﬀerent underlying assets on EuRex is smaller, it has almost twice as many diﬀerent options as
EuWax, since it oﬀers many more contracts per underlying asset (264) than EuWax (38 for calls and
14 for puts). EuRex oﬀers both more expiration dates per underlying asset and a larger number of
strike prices per expiration date and underlying asset.
3.3. Matching of EuRex and EuWax Options
3.3.1. Option Characteristics
For the subsequent empirical analysis, the sample period is restricted to the year 2000 and to EuRex
and EuWax options on six underlying assets: two indices, the German DAX index and the Euro-
pean Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, and four stocks, Deutsche Bank, Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche
Telekom, and Siemens. As a result, the sample consists of 5,411 EuRex options and 4,389 EuWax
options. DAX and Euro Stoxx 50 options are the most heavily traded EuRex options during the
year 2000, accounting for approximately 46% of EuRex total volume. Options on the four stocks
are among the most heavily traded EuRex equity options during the year 2000, accounting for ap-
proximately 29% of EuRex total volume. Collectively, options on the selected six underlying assets
account for approximately 75% of EuRex total volume. Similarly, EuWax options on the six under-
lying assets represent a large share of EuWax trading volume. However, not surprisingly given the
much larger number of underlying assets on EuWax, the share of EuWax total volume represented
by the selected underlying assets is lower at approximately 41%. The volume of the selected EuWax
options is approximately 15% of the volume of the selected EuRex options. Comparing the volume
of the selected EuWax options to the volume of the selected EuRex options by underlying asset,
one observes considerable variation. At the low end, Euro Stoxx 50 and Deutsche Telekom EuWax
options account for 1% and 6%, respectively, of their corresponding EuRex options. The percentages
are 13%, 14%, and 17% for Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche Bank, and Siemens options, respectively.
9Finally, EuWax DAX option volume represents 28% of its EuRex counterpart. The EuWax DAX
option market is larger than the three smaller EuRex option markets for Deutsche Bank, Daimler
Chrysler and Siemens.
The next step is to match EuRex options with competing EuWax options which provide in-
vestors with identical or similar payoﬀ functions. Given that matched options have identical or
similar payoﬀ functions, any observed diﬀerences should be due to other factors, such as liquidity
provision. We create three mutually exclusive categories of matches that diﬀer with respect to the
required matching characteristics. All matches have the same underlying asset and option type.
Category 1 matches also have the same strike price, expiration date, and exercise style resulting
in identical payoﬀ functions for both options. Category 2 matches have the same strike price, and
exercise style, but the EuWax expiration date diﬀers by ± 1 to 7 days from the EuRex expiration
date, as small deviations in maturity may be perceived similar by investors given the long average
maturity of EuWax options discussed above. Category 3 matches have the same strike price, and the
EuWax expiration date may diﬀer by ± 1 to 7 days from the EuRex expiration date. Furthermore,
the exercise style can be diﬀerent, but the matches are limited to index call options. Category 3 has
the following rationale. Index options on EuRex are exclusively European-style options, while index
options on EuWax are predominantly although not exclusively American-style options. Since both
DAX and Euro Stoxx 50 are total performance indices with reinvestment of dividends, option pricing
theory suggests that it is never optimal to exercise American call options early. Thus, American and
European index call options should have the same value.
In the matching procedure, a EuRex option can potentially be matched with several EuWax
options both because slight variations in option characteristics are allowed in categories 2 and 3, and
because there are EuWax options with identical characteristics from diﬀerent issuers which count as
individual matched pairs with their EuRex counterpart. However, we enforce a rule such that each
EuWax option is matched with only one EuRex option to achieve the best match quality given by the
smallest diﬀerence in expiration dates. Table 3 contains summary statistics of the resulting sample
of matched options. There are 2,361 matched pairs for 903 unique EuRex options distributed over
199 category 1 matches, 898 category 2 matches, and 1,264 category 3 matches. Not surprisingly,
given the general distribution of EuWax options, there are many more call option matches (2,173)
than put option matches (188). The number of matches per underlying asset ranges from 221 for
Deutsche Bank options to 1,010 for DAX options. For almost all underlying assets and option types,
the sample of matches exhibits considerable variation across strike prices and expiration dates. While
only approximately 17% of all EuRex options in the sample are matched, they account for 32% of all
trading volume among the EuRex options for the six underlying assets, and thus represent 24% of
10EuRex total volume. Similarly, the matched EuWax options account for 59% of all trading volume
among the EuWax options for the six underlying assets and thus represent 24% of EuWax total
volume. The fact that EuWax trading volume is concentrated in EuWax options with a EuRex
match also implies that the trading volume of the matched EuWax options represents a larger share
of the trading volume of their matching EuRex options than the above mentioned overall (including
matching and non-matching options) average of 15%. In fact, the trading volume of matched EuWax
options represents 29% of their matched EuRex counterparts.
3.3.2. Option Quotes
For the year 2000, the KKMDB database contains 25,485,590 unique quotes for EuRex options on
the six selected underlying assets. The 903 EuRex options with matching EuWax options account
for 5,041,031 unique quotes or roughly one-ﬁfth of the total number of quotes. Each of the EuRex
quotes is matched with EuWax quotes. Since some EuRex options have multiple EuWax matches,
they may have multiple EuWax quote matches as well. For each EuRex quote and corresponding
EuWax option, we ﬁnd the most recent EuWax quote posted prior to the EuWax quote on the same
day. Initially, this results in 9,699,923 EuRex-EuWax quote pairs. However, it is frequently the case
that the same EuWax quote is matched with several EuRex quotes, because EuRex quotes tend to
cluster more in time than EuWax quotes. Therefore only one EuRex-EuWax quote pair is retained
such that the time diﬀerence between quotes is minimized. This yields 3,294,694 quote pairs.
Next, we introduce several ﬁlters to eliminate bad quotes and reduce asynchroneity. We elim-
inate all quote pairs with a time diﬀerence greater than ﬁve minutes resulting in 3,163,369 quote
pairs, all quote pairs for which either ask quote is zero or smaller than the corresponding bid quote
resulting in 3,156,848 quote pairs, and all quote pairs with a diﬀerence between the two ask quotes or
the two bid quotes greater than 50% of the EuRex quote. This results in 3,062,245 quote pairs. Since
match categories 2 and 3 allow for a diﬀerence in expiration date between the EuRex option and
the matching EuWax option, all observations for which the EuRex option has less than two weeks
remaining until maturity are excluded. This ensures that all options included have at least one week
remaining until maturity, since EuWax options in match categories 2 and 3 can have up to one week
shorter maturity than the corresponding EuRex option. The ﬁnal sample contains 2,914,515q u o t e
pairs. To compare the two markets, we compute the following measures for each quote pair: the
ratio of EuWax ask to EuRex ask (hereafter also referred to as ask ratio), the ratio of EuWax bid to
EuRex bid (hereafter also referred to as bid ratio), the EuWax and EuRex percentage bid-ask spreads
computed as the ratio of ask and bid diﬀerence to ask, and the time diﬀerence between the EuWax
and the EuRex quote. The number of quote pairs per day varies markedly over the EuRex-EuWax
11option matches. Therefore, we compute daily averages of the above measures for each EuRex-EuWax
option match. This results in a panel of 95,566 daily observations of EuRex-EuWax option matches.
4. Empirical Evidence
We ﬁrst provide a detailed univariate comparison of matched EuRex and EuWax options. We then
provide multivariate results and robustness checks. Finally, we also give evidence on whether com-
petition from one market improves liquidity (as measured by bid-ask spreads) in the other market.
4.1. Univariate Results for EuRex-EuWax Matches
We group all daily observations by underlying asset, option type (call or put), and match category,
forming 22 groups, and then compute averages within each group. The resulting univariate statistics
are shown in Table 4. The average time diﬀerence over all groups is 59 seconds. Irrespective of
underlying asset, option type, or match category a systematic pattern emerges. EuWax ask quotes
are higher than EuRex ask quotes by an average of 4.7% over all daily observations. Of the 22 group
averages, 20 are signiﬁcant at the 1% level or better and another one is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Among the 21 signiﬁcant averages, 19 show EuWax ask prices to be higher than EuRex ask prices.
The two groups with EuWax ask prices, which are signiﬁcantly smaller than EuRex ask prices, both
have a comparatively small number of daily observations. EuWax bid quotes are on average 9.9%
higher than EuRex bid quotes. Of the 22 per group means, 21 are signiﬁcant at the 1%l e v e lo r
better, and all but one show EuWax bid prices to be higher than EuRex bid prices. For all 19o ft h e
22 groups, in which both EuWax ask and bid prices are higher than EuRex ask and bid prices, the
bid price diﬀerence is signiﬁcantly larger than the ask price diﬀerence at the 1% level or better.
The average diﬀerence of the bid and ask ratios is 5.2%, which implies that EuWax bid-ask
spreads are smaller than EuRex bid-ask spreads. The EuWax bid-ask spreads over all daily observa-
tions are 2.8%, which compares fairly closely to the 3.2% reported by Petrella (2001)i nas a m p l eo f
1,085 Italian bank-issued option quotes. In contrast, the average bid-ask spread is 7.1%f o rE u R e x
options. EuWax bid-ask spreads are smaller than EuRex bid-ask spreads in each of the 22 groups with
21 of the bid-ask spread diﬀerences signiﬁcant at the 1% level or better. Since EuWax options tend
to have lower trading volume than EuRex options, the results on bid-ask spreads are also consistent
with results by Cho and Engle (1999) indicating that the negative empirical relation between volume
and bid-ask spreads, which is well supported for primary assets, does not necessarily apply to option
markets. It appears that the results are consistent with the idea of diﬀering clienteles suggested in
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may be willing to pay a higher ask price on EuWax, expecting to beneﬁt from a higher bid price (and
thereby smaller round-trip transaction costs) when the option position is liquidated in the future.
Next, we investigate whether the relation indicated by the averages above holds consistently for
many quotes. To this end, each of the 95,566 daily observations is categorized based on the relation
among the ask and bid quotes. To reduce the number of cases, quote pairs are excluded, in which
the comparable bid and/or ask are equal, i.e., the ask ratio (AR)o rt h eb i dr a t i o( BR)i se q u a lt o
one. This eliminates fewer than 1% of all quote pairs and leaves six cases:
Case 1 : BR > AR > 1
Case 2 : BR > 1 >A R
Case 3 : 1 >B R>A R (1)
Case 4 : AR > BR > 1
Case 5 : 1 >A R>B R
Case 6 : AR > 1 >B R
For each case, we compute the average ask and bid ratios by underlying asset, option type (call or
put), and match category.
Table 5 shows that the full sample results hold consistently across quote pairs as case 1 is the
most frequent. Averaged over all underlying assets, types, and match categories, 63% of the quote
pairs exhibit higher EuWax ask prices as well as even higher EuWax bid prices. Over the 22 groups,
the share of such quote pairs ranges from 11%t o100%. The average ask price diﬀerence in this
relation is 6%, while the average bid price diﬀerence is 12%. Case 1 allows for situations in which
EuWax bid prices exceed EuRex ask prices. However, as pointed out previously, investors are unable
to arbitrage such cases due to the inability to short EuWax options.
The next largest average share of quote pairs is 27% for case 2, in which the EuWax ask price
is lower than the EuRex ask price and the EuWax bid price is higher than the EuRex bid price.
This relation (if maintained over the life of the option) would render EuWax options preferable for
all investors. Over the 22 groups, the share of such cases ranges from 0% to 54%. In this situation,
EuWax ask prices are on average 2% cheaper than EuRex ask prices and EuWax bid prices are on
average 5% higher than EuRex bid prices.
Case 3, in which both the EuWax bid and ask quote are smaller than their EuRex counterpart
w i t ht h ea s kq u o t ed i ﬀerence being larger, accounts for 8% of quote pairs, on average. Over the 22
groups, the share of this case ranges from 0% to 50%. The EuWax ask price is on average lower
13by 8%, while the EuWax bid price is only lower by on average 4%. Thus, all investors would prefer
EuWax options, since the savings from the lower ask prices are greater than potential losses from the
lower bid prices. Case 3 may include situations in which EuRex bid prices exceed EuWax ask prices
for options with identical payoﬀ functions. Ignoring other transaction costs, such situations could
constitute potential arbitrage opportunities, as investors are able to write (i.e., short) EuRex options.
The potential arbitrage situation occurs in less than 1%o ft h e2 , 9 14,515 quote pairs in the sample
and the median diﬀerence of the two prices is less than 2.5%. Many of the potential arbitrage quote
pairs may be due to asynchroneity, which is conﬁrmed by the fact that the mean time diﬀerence is
around 3 minutes (as compared to 59 seconds for the entire sample).
Cases 4 and 6 constitute situations in which all investors would prefer EuRex options. These
two cases together account for only 1.4% of the observations. Over the 22 groups, their combined
share is never larger than 8%. Finally, case 5 is a special case as both EuWax ask and bid prices
are lower than on EuRex with the bid price diﬀerence being larger. In this situation, an investor
expecting early liquidation prefers EuWax options if the savings from the lower ask price are larger
than the expected loss from the lower bid price thereby implying an upper, rather than a lower,
bound on the likelihood of early liquidation. However, this case is quite rare as it occurs in only 0.5%
of the observations.
Overall, the analysis of bid ratios and ask ratios by quote relation conﬁrms the systematic
pattern of higher ask and bid prices, and smaller bid-ask spreads on EuWax compared to EuRex.
An important caveat applies to the above discussion in the sense that when we speak of investors’
preferences for one market or the other, we base the discussion solely on transaction costs derived
from quoted bid-ask spreads. As pointed out in Section 2, there are additional factors which we
expect to aﬀect an investor’s choice between the two markets. Several such additional factors are
investigated in the subsequent multivariate analysis.
4.2. Multivariate Results for EuRex-EuWax Matches
4.2.1.A s k R a t i o s
This section investigates, in a multivariate setting, how the quote competitiveness of EuWax options
relative to EuRex options varies in the sample. A natural measure of relative competitiveness is the
ratio of ask prices since it aﬀects all option buyers irrespective of the likelihood of early liquidation.
Since EuWax options cannot be shorted, the appropriate comparison is for an investor who wants
to buy options. While precise data are diﬃcult to obtain, discussions with market participants
indicate that EuRex market makers are on average short in options implying that the average EuRex
14option investor is also a buyer. For this analysis, the 2,914,515 matched quote pairs described in
Section 3.3.1 are used. For each EuWax option in the matched data set, we calculate monthly
averages of all variables which results in an unbalanced panel of 8,185 monthly observations for the
2,361 EuWax options with EuRex matches. The multivariate analysis uses monthly averages rather
than the previously employed daily averages for two reasons. First, most of the variables used in
the subsequent analysis exhibit relatively little time-series variation, which would tend to overstate
signiﬁcance levels in the multivariate analysis. Secondly, employing a lower frequency reduces the
problem of potential serial correlation in the ask and bid ratio measures.
Summary statistics for the panel are shown in Table 6. Each monthly observation of ask and bid
ratios is based on an average of 355 quotes with a standard deviation of 628 quotes. The average ask
ratio is around 1.05, and the average bid ratio is around 1.09. The average number of EuWax options
competing with each other and the matching EuRex option is 2.7; the maximum is 8 competing
EuWax options. The ratio of EuWax minimum trade size (in units of the underlying asset) to EuRex
minimum trade size averages 2.6% with a standard deviation of 5.7% and a maximum of 50%. The
guaranteed maximum bid-ask spread in Euros averages 17 cents for EuWax options with a standard
deviation of 50 cents. We create a dummy equal to one, if the issuing institution of a EuWax option
is also a market maker for the matching EuRex option. This is the case for 59% of all EuRex-EuWax
pairs.
We compute the annualized standard deviation of the underlying asset’s daily returns during
the observation month. Daily return and price information for the underlying assets is obtained from
Datastream. The standard deviation averages 32% and ranges from 11% to 77%. For each option
pair, we compute daily time to expiration in days using the expiration date of the EuRex option, and
moneyness (ratio of underlying asset price to strike price for calls; ratio of strike price to underlying
asset price for puts) using the underlying asset’s closing price. The daily values are averaged for each
observation month. Time to expiration averages 221 days with a standard deviation of 155 days and
ranges from 14 days to 730 days. Moneyness averages 102% with a standard deviation of 26% and
ranges from 37% to 347%.
Three regression speciﬁcations are employed using the EuWax to EuRex ask ratio as the depen-
dent variable. The following variables are present in all speciﬁcations: EuWax to EuRex bid ratio,
number of competing EuWax options, underlying asset standard deviation, option type (dummy
equal to one for puts), moneyness, and time to expiration. As discussed previously, if investors are
split between the two markets based on their expected holding periods, the bid ratio should have a
positive coeﬃcient, which ought, however, to be smaller than one, given that the average investor’s
probability of early liquidation is also expected to be smaller than one. The number of competing
15EuWax options should have a negative eﬀect on the ask ratio since increased competition should
drive down option investors’ transaction costs. Standard deviation, option type, moneyness, and
time to expiration are used as control variables. In addition to the above variables, speciﬁcation 1
also contains the EuRex market maker dummy as an explanatory variable. If the EuRex market is
one of the venues used by EuWax issuers to hedge their own exposures from selling EuWax options,
it could be argued that issuers that are also EuRex market makers in the same underlying asset may
enjoy hedging cost advantages. If these hedging cost advantages are passed on to EuWax option
buyers, the coeﬃcient of the market maker dummy should be negative.
Speciﬁcation 2 includes dummy variables for the underlying assets and EuWax issuers. The
dummies are designed such that the regular intercept represents DAX EuWax options (the largest
EuWax segment) issued by Citibank (the largest EuWax issuer). The market maker dummy is
excluded from speciﬁcation 2, since it is perfectly correlated with the issuer dummy in several cases.
Speciﬁcation 3 adds the EuWax issuer’s guaranteed maximum bid-ask spread and the ratio of EuWax
to EuRex minimum trade size as explanatory variables to speciﬁcation 2. Both variables should have
negative coeﬃcients. Investors wishing to liquidate early should prefer a lower maximum guaranteed
bid-ask spread, since it increases the expected future bid price, ceteris paribus. If EuWax issuers
are compensated for this guarantee, they should be able to charge higher ask prices. Similarly, if
EuWax investors are on average smaller investors than EuRex investors, they prefer smaller minimum
trade sizes, which again allows the EuWax issuer to raise its ask price all else equal. These last two
variables are only available for a subset of EuWax options, which reduces the sample to 3,801 monthly
observations.
The results of the regressions are shown in Table 7. All standard errors are robust to het-
eroskedasticity and ﬁrst-order serial correlation. Since most coeﬃcient estimates are consistent across
the three speciﬁcations, the discussion is combined. As expected, the coeﬃcient for the bid ratio is
positive, less than one at approximately 0.7, and signiﬁcant, indicating that EuWax option buyers
paying higher relative ask prices can expect to be compensated via even higher relative bid prices.12
The coeﬃcient for the number of competing EuWax options is negative and signiﬁcant, which is
consistent with the idea that competition among EuWax issuers lowers transaction costs for EuWax
option buyers. The coeﬃcient for the underlying asset standard deviation is negative and signiﬁcant.
Given that this result also holds in the speciﬁcations that include underlying asset dummies, one can
interpret this result as an indication that, relative to EuRex options, EuWax liquidity is less aﬀected
in periods of higher uncertainty. Time to expiration is negative and signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst two spec-
12 There are potential endogeneity problems using the bid ratio as a regressor. Thus we estimate
speciﬁcation 3 excluding the bid ratio. With the exception of relative minimum trade size, all
signiﬁcant variables from the orginal speciﬁcation 3 maintain sign and signiﬁcance.
16iﬁcations, but switches sign and becomes insigniﬁcant in speciﬁcation 3. The put dummy coeﬃcient
is negative and signiﬁcant at the 10% level or better in all regressions. Moneyness has a positive
coeﬃcient, but is only marginally signiﬁcant in one speciﬁcation. Each speciﬁcation is also run (re-
sults not shown) with moneyness and moneyness squared to investigate potential non-linear eﬀects of
moneyness, but there are no signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for the moneyness measures. The market maker
dummy coeﬃcient has the predicted negative sign, but is insigniﬁcant. On the other hand, both the
maximum bid-ask spread and the relative minimum trade size coeﬃcients have negative signs and
are signiﬁcant, lending support to the idea that EuWax issuers can trade oﬀ more competitive quotes
(lower ask ratios) for other market-making features that are important to the EuWax option buyers.
Relative to DAX options, several other underlying assets have signiﬁcantly lower ask ratios:
Deutsche Bank options and Deutsche Telekom options in speciﬁcations 2 and 3, Euro Stoxx 50
options in speciﬁcation 3 only. Interestingly, there also appears to be considerable variation in ask
ratios across issuers relative to the market leader Citibank. BNP Paribas, and Sal. Oppenheim
are cheaper in both speciﬁcations, while Dresdner Bank, UBS Warburg, and Unicredito Italiano are
cheaper in speciﬁcation 2 only. Credit Lyonnais, Commerzbank, DG Bank, Rabobank, and Societe
Generale are more expensive in both speciﬁcations, while Merrill Lynch and West LB are more
expensive in speciﬁcation 3 only.13 Adjusted ﬁt lies between 73% and 75% for the three speciﬁcations.
On the whole, the results have several interesting implications. For one, competition among issuers
beneﬁts investors by driving down EuWax ask prices. Secondly, the evidence supports the notion
that liquidity is multi-dimensional in that there is a trade-oﬀ between quote competitiveness and
other market-making features.
If diﬀerences in investors’ expected holding periods are one of the factors aﬀecting quoting
behavior in the two markets, an additional test can be based on the time-series properties of ask
ratios. The idea is that as a particular option approaches maturity, the probability of holding
the option to expiration increases and the probability of liquidating before expiration decreases.
Therefore, the incentive to pay a higher ask price in the EuWax market decreases, and the ask ratio
should decrease over time. While the results in the above regressions are inconclusive with respect
to time to expiration, they suﬀer from the problem that the estimated coeﬃcient measures both
cross-sectional as well as time-series variation in time to expiration. To produce a cleaner test of
the time-series eﬀects alone, the sample is split by EuRex expiration dates thereby eliminating any
cross-sectional variation in time to expiration. To ensure that all time series are available over the
full year 2000 sample period, the analysis focuses on options expiring in 2001 and 2002 resulting
13 A potential explanation of signiﬁcant issuer dummies could be variation in issuer default risk.
However, an analysis (results not shown) of a potential link between issuer dummies and accounting
measures of ﬁnancial strength/leverage/default risk does not reveal any signiﬁcant results.
17in seven diﬀerent expiration date samples. Two expiration dates are eliminated as their samples
contain fewer than 20 monthly observations. The remaining ﬁve expiration dates range from March
2001 to June 2002 with sample sizes ranging from 255 to 1,491 observations. We then estimate the
above three regression speciﬁcations for each of the ﬁve expiration date samples. Table 8 shows the
estimated coeﬃcients and t-statistics for time to expiration. Estimated coeﬃcients for the remaining
variables are not shown but are generally consistent with the previous results. All but one of the
15c o e ﬃcients on time to expiration are positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level or better. Based
on the estimated coeﬃcients, the table also shows the decrease in the ask ratio as the options age
by one month. This monthly decrease ranges from 20 to 93 basis points and thus also appears to
be economically signiﬁcant. These results indicate that the mixed evidence on time to expiration in
the previous panel regressions may be due to the confounding eﬀect of combining cross-sectional and
time-series variation. Once cross-sectional variation is removed, a positive relation between time to
expiration and EuWax to EuRex ask ratio is observed, which is consistent with the idea that EuWax
and EuRex quotes move closer together as the length of an option pair’s potential holding period
decreases.
4.2.2. Probability of Early Liquidation
To further explore potential diﬀerences between the two markets with respect to investors’ holding
periods, one can use the observed ask ratios and bid ratios to construct a measure of the implied
probability of early liquidation at which investors are divided into EuRex and EuWax clients. The
interpretation of this measure is such that all investors with a higher probability than this cut-oﬀ
value select EuWax, while all investors with a lower probability than this cut-oﬀ value select EuRex,
assuming that investors choose solely based on expected transaction costs represented by bid-ask
spreads. The appendix gives a detailed explanation of the probability of early liquidation cut-oﬀ
(PELC) measure. We compute daily values of the PELC measure using the daily observations of
the ask and bid ratios employed previously. We then take monthly averages of the daily PELC
values for each EuRex-EuWax option pair. The average PELC value over all monthly observations
is 39% with a standard deviation of 28%. Two measures are employed to assess which options may
attract investors with speculative motives who may exhibit higher probabilities of early liquidation as
measured by the PELC values. The ﬁrst measure of speculativeness is the option’s omega commonly
used by practitioners:
Omega = ∆ ×
S
AW (2)
where ∆ is the option’s delta, S is the value of the underlying asset, and AW is the EuWax ask price.
Options with high omegas are attractive to investors with speculative motives since omega measures
18the elasticity of option prices with respect to the value of the underlying asset. Therefore, omega
measures the return leverage of an option position rather than the price leverage which is measured




Options with high vegas are attractive to investors with speculative motives regarding the underlying
asset’s volatility. Similar to the choice of omega rather than delta, we use the ratio of vega to the
option’s price rather than vega itself. The vega ratio can be interpreted as the option’s percentage
price change given a one percent change in the underlying asset’s standard deviation. For European
EuWax options, delta and vega are computed using the option pricing formulas with continuous
dividend yields as derived by Merton (1973). For American EuWax options, delta and vega are com-
puted using the analytic approximation as derived by Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1987).14 Omegas
a n dv e g ar a t i o sa r ec o m p u t e dd a i l ya n dt h e na v e r a g e df o re a c hm o n t hi nt h es a m p l e . W er e g r e s s
the probability of early liquidation measure (PELC) on both measures of speculativeness using time
to expiration and option type as control variables. The results of the regression are shown in Table
9. Adjusted ﬁt for the regression is 23.9%. We observe a positive relation between the PELC mea-
sure and time to expiration, which supports the notion that, all else equal, the probability of early
liquidation should increase with time to expiration. The coeﬃcient for option type is negative, indi-
cating a lower PELC measure for put options. Both omega and vega ratio have positive signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients, which is consistent with the idea that investors with speculative motives have shorter
expected holding periods than investors with hedging motives.
4.3. Robustness
The results suggest that investors with a high probability of early liquidation may be willing to
pay higher EuWax ask prices to beneﬁt from lower round-trip transaction costs (as measured by
bid-ask spreads) for EuWax options. In the following, we discuss potential alternative explanations
for the above ﬁndings. In particular, we consider eﬀective vs. quoted spreads, brokerage costs,
market-making costs, and liquidity premiums.
4.3.1.E ﬀective Spreads vs. Quoted Spreads
Most of the analysis is based on a comparison of quotes rather than transactions due to the unavail-
ability of large-scale transaction data for EuWax options. While we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
14 For each month in the sample, we use European Central Bank deposit facility rates as the
risk-free rate. We employ historic dividend yields of the underlying assets during the year 2000
obtained from OnVista AG. Standard deviations are year 2000 averages of the monthly standard
deviations used in the preceeding regressions.
19quoted bid-ask spreads between the two markets, it is possible that the same relation is weaker for
eﬀective bid-ask spreads if, for example, transactions inside the quoted spread are more frequent on
EuRex than on EuWax. The following analysis investigates this issue. A sample of time-stamped
transaction prices is provided by the EuWax exchange.15 We select transaction prices of EuWax
options with matching EuRex options as deﬁned previously. Each EuWax transaction is matched
with a corresponding EuRex transaction provided that the time diﬀerence between the two is less
than one hour.16 Next each transaction is matched with the immediately preceding quote from each
respective market such that the quote is no more than ten minutes before the corresponding trans-
action. We then compute quoted bid-ask spreads as deﬁned previously and eﬀective bid-ask spreads
EFF deﬁned as:
EFF =
2 ×| P − M|
A
, (4)
where P is the transaction price, M is the average of the corresponding bid and ask quotes, and A
is the corresponding ask quote. We also record the share of all transactions taking place inside the
spread. As before, we form groups by underlying asset, option type (call or put), and match category,
and compute averages which are reported in Table 10. Groups with fewer than ten observations are
excluded leaving 1,261 observations in eleven groups.
The results indicate that the incidence of inside-quote transactions is indeed higher on EuRex
than on EuWax at 72.2% and 21.3% of all observations, respectively. The more frequent occurrence
of inside-quote transactions translates into a larger diﬀerence between quoted spreads and eﬀective
spreads on EuRex compared to EuWax. Average quoted and eﬀective spreads on EuRex are 8.3%
and 4.4%, respectively, while they are 3.6% and 2.6%, respectively, for EuWax. Thus, the diﬀerence
b e t w e e nb i d - a s ks p r e a d so nE u R e xa n dE u W a xs h r i n k sw h e nm e a s u r e db ye ﬀective spreads. However,
across all groups the diﬀerence in eﬀective spreads of 1.8% is signiﬁcant at the 1% level indicating
that EuRex-EuWax diﬀerences persist when measured via eﬀective spreads. While the sample of
eﬀective spreads is too small to allow a meaningful replication of the multivariate analyses, the fact
that economically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in bid-ask spreads persist for eﬀective spreads indicates that
the results based on quoted spreads are unlikely to be driven solely by diﬀerences in the frequency
of inside-quote transactions.
15 For each day and option, EuWax keeps the last entry in its real-time database in a second
database of historic records. Most of the time this last entry is a quote rather than a transaction
and thus we cannot use it for the analysis leading to the small sample size compared to the sample
of quotes.
16 Due to the small size of the data set, we are forced to allow a larger time diﬀerence than
previously employed in order to obtain a reasonable number of observations for the ﬁnal sample.
204.3.2. Bid-Ask Spreads vs. Brokerage Costs
Another potential reason why investors may be willing to pay higher EuWax ask prices, is that
transaction costs unrelated to bid-ask spreads may be lower for EuWax options.17 To investigate the
issue of transaction cost diﬀerences unrelated to bid-ask spreads, we perform the following analysis
for the German markets using DAX options.18 Detailed pricing schedules are obtained from three
large German on-line brokerages that oﬀer both EuWax and EuRex trading: Comdirect (owned
by Commerzbank), Consors (owned by BNP Paribas), and Fimatex (majority owned by Societe
Generale). In the case of Consors, the comparison is relatively straightforward as both EuWax and
EuRex option trades are charged as a percentage of the transaction value (in addition to a ﬂat charge
for each trade). The EuWax charge of 0.25% is half of the EuRex charge of 0.50%. Comdirect and
Fimatex charge EuWax options primarily through a percentage (in addition to a ﬂat fee), while
EuRex options are charged per contract. Thus, the brokerage cost diﬀerence depends on the value
of the option.
To generate a range of typical option trade values, we ﬁrst set the EuWax contract size to 0.01
Euros per index point, which is the most common contract size representing 80% of the EuWax DAX
options in the sample of EuRex-EuWax pairs. EuRex DAX options have a contract size of 5 Euros
per index point. For each EuWax option with 0.01 Euros contract size, we compute the average
ask price over all EuRex-EuWax quote pairs in the sample. Next, we analyze the cross-sectional
variation of the ask prices. Over all EuWax options, the mean and median ask price is 7.66 and 4.76
Euros, respectively. In addition, we use the top and bottom decile ask prices of 19.01 and 1.05 Euros,
respectively. For each of the four option prices, we compute three trade values corresponding to 1, 10,
and 100 EuRex contracts. Finally, we calculate the brokerage costs for each of the resulting twelve
trade values under each brokerage’s pricing schedule. The results are shown in Table 11.W h i l e
brokerage costs for EuWax option trades are generally lower than brokerage costs for EuRex options,
with the exception of the smallest trade for the lowest-price option, all brokerage cost diﬀerences
are less than 1% of the trade value. Given that the average diﬀerence in the quoted bid-ask spreads
between EuRex and EuWax equals more than four times the value of the largest brokerage cost
diﬀerence, it is unlikely that brokerage cost diﬀerences alone could be responsible for the observed
diﬀerences in bid and ask prices across the two markets.
17 Horst and Veld (2002) compare brokerage costs for Dutch bank-issued options and option
contracts from a derivatives exchange, and ﬁnd economically signiﬁcant brokerage cost advantages
only in the case of very low-priced (≤ 0.2 Euro) bank-issued options. For bank-issued options with
prices of 0.5 Euro or above, the brokerage cost advantage is never larger than 0.9% of the option
value, and there are several cases in which traditional option contracts have lower brokerage costs.
18 A similar analysis (not shown) for the other underlying assets yields comparable results.
214.3.3. Market-Making Costs
It is possible that the diﬀerences in bid-ask spreads are driven by diﬀerences in the costs of market-
making. EuRex market makers can gamma-hedge by oﬀsetting customer purchases with customer
writes. EuWax market makers are unable to gamma-hedge since the short-sale restriction prevents
customers from writing options. On the other hand, EuWax issuers may be able to hedge their
exposures from selling EuWax options by purchasing comparable EuRex options. Furthermore, given
that most EuWax issuers are major international banks, it may also be the case that they can sell
EuWax options on underlying assets to which they already have an oﬀ-setting exposure from some
other part of their business. On the whole, it is unclear which of the two markets would provide
market makers with hedging cost advantages. However, note that even if EuWax market makers enjoy
hedging cost advantages, which may lead to smaller EuWax bid-ask spreads, it does not explain why
the smaller bid-ask spreads are not simply symmetric around the option value, but rather exhibit the
reported consistent diﬀerences between EuRex and EuWax bid and ask prices. Recall also that the
market maker dummy in the regression analysis is insigniﬁcant which is inconsistent with the idea
that EuWax market makers’ hedging cost advantages are reﬂected in their quotes.
Market microstructure theory also suggests that quotes should reﬂect adverse selection costs.
It could be argued that EuWax market makers face little adverse selection costs on the bid side due
to the short-sale constraint. Lower adverse selection costs should, ceteris paribus, result in smaller
bid-ask spreads driven by higher bid prices on EuWax which is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings.
However, adverse selection costs cannot explain why ask prices on EuWax should also be higher which
is what is observed in the data. Furthermore, Cho and Engle (1999) argue that adverse selection
costs should have relatively little impact on option bid-ask spreads compared to bid-ask spreads
for primary assets because option market makers can hedge their exposures as explained above.
Secondly, the regression results with respect to the probability of early liquidation support the idea
that speculators, who are arguably more likely than hedgers to have information advantages, may
prefer the EuWax market which should drive up adverse selection costs for EuWax market makers.
4.3.4. Liquidity Premium
Chan and Pinder (2000) study a sample of 252 matched trades of Australian bank-issued equity
options and option contracts from a traditional derivatives exchange. They ﬁnd that bank-issued
options have on average higher transaction prices than comparable traditional option contracts and
argue that the diﬀerence may be due to a liquidity premium for bank-issued options. This liquidity
premium is motivated by the fact that Australian bank-issued options in the sample are electronically
traded as opposed to ﬂoor trading for the derivatives exchange, which Chan and Pinder (2000) argue
22leads to faster execution and better transparency for bank-issued options. Furthermore, bank-issued
options in their sample tend to have higher trading volumes than comparable option contracts. It is
diﬃcult to see how similar arguments of a liquidity premium could be applied to the EuRex-EuWax
comparison. While there is no direct evidence on speed of execution, the monthly trading volume of
EuWax options is larger than the monthly trading volume of matching EuRex options in only 17%
of the observations. Thus, it appears that, if anything, the traditional derivatives exchange is more
liquid in our sample which should lead to higher EuRex prices rather than the higher EuWax prices
which are observed in the data.
4.4. Options With and Without Competition from the Other Market
While the preceding sections show signiﬁcant diﬀerences between EuRex and EuWax, it is unlikely
that the EuRex and EuWax option markets are fully segmented. If investors are willing to switch
between the two markets, one would expect that the competitive pressure from the other market will
positively aﬀect liquidity relative to options in each market that are not subject to competition from
the other market. To investigate this issue, we provide a comparison within each market between
bid-ask spreads of options with competition from the other market and bid-ask spreads of options
without competition from the other market.
4.4.1.E ﬀect of EuWax Competition on EuRex Bid-Ask Spreads
For each of the 903 EuRex options that have at least one competing EuWax option, we ﬁnd matching
EuRex options that at no point during the sample period have a competing EuWax option. We
require that the matching EuRex option has the same underlying asset and type. From the eligible
EuRex options without EuWax competition, the one with average daily trading volume closest to
the average daily trading volume of the EuRex option (with EuWax competition) is selected each
month.19 Although the previous results indicate that there may not be a strong relation between
trading volume and bid-ask spreads, we nonetheless conform to this matching procedure, since it is,
for example, used by Mayhew (2002) in the existing literature.
The 2,914,515 quote pairs used in Section 3.3.1 correspond to 1,362,192 unique EuRex quotes.20
For each of the unique EuRex quotes, we obtain a quote for the matching EuRex option without
EuWax competition such that the time diﬀerence between the two EuRex quotes is minimized. Next,
19 Since matches can have diﬀering expiration dates in this analysis, average daily volume is used
instead of monthly volume because one of the two options in a match may expire during the
observation month. Among EuRex options without EuWax competition, multiple matches with
diﬀerent EuRex options (with EuWax competition) are allowed.
20 The number of EuRex-EuWax quote pairs is higher, since each EuRex option can be matched
with several competing EuWax options.
23a ﬁlter is introduced to reduce asynchroneity by eliminating all EuRex-EuRex quote pairs with a time
diﬀerence greater than ﬁve minutes. The ﬁltering procedure results in 769,575 quote pairs. As before,
we eliminate all quote pairs if at least one of the two options in the pair has less than two weeks until
maturity. This reduces the sample to 642,146 pairs. Finally, all pairs are excluded if the average
daily trading volume during the sample month diﬀers by more than 20%. The ﬁnal sample contains
561,578 quote pairs. For each quote pair, we compute the following measures: the percentage bid-ask
spread, ratio of the ask price of the EuRex option without EuWax competition to the ask price of the
EuRex option with EuWax competition, and time diﬀerence. As previously, we then compute daily
averages of the above measures for each EuRex-EuRex option match. This results in 19,118d a i l y
observations of EuRex-EuRex option matches. DAX and Euro Stoxx 50 put options are excluded as
both have fewer than 50 daily observations. This reduces the number of observations to 19,083.
Finally, we compute averages by underlying asset and option type, forming ten groups. As
s h o w ni nT a b l e12, the average time diﬀerence between matching quotes is 82 seconds. The ratio
of volume for options without EuWax competition to volume for options with EuWax competition
is close to one in all groups. The ask price ratio is larger than one in all groups. The latter result
may bias us against ﬁnding lower bid-ask spreads for EuRex options with EuWax competition since
minimum tick sizes create a lower bound on the percentage bid-ask spread of low-priced options.
Nonetheless, we ﬁnd that in six out of ten groups, bid-ask spreads for EuRex options with EuWax
competition are signiﬁcantly (1% level) lower than the bid-ask spreads of their EuRex matches
without EuWax competition. Only in one group is the relation signiﬁcant and reversed. The average
bid-ask spread diﬀerence over all groups is 1.7% with a maximum of 6.6% for Siemens put options.
In general, the results indicate that EuWax competition indeed has a positive eﬀect on the liquidity
of EuRex options as measured by bid-ask spreads.
4.4.2. Eﬀect of EuRex Competition on EuWax Bid-Ask Spreads
We also analyze the eﬀect of competition from EuRex on EuWax bid-ask spreads. To this end, for
each of the 2,361 EuWax options which have a competing EuRex option, we ﬁnd matching EuWax
options which at no point during the sample period have a competing EuRex option, following the
procedure outlined in the previous section. For each of the 2,914,515 unique EuWax quotes used
in Section 3.3.1, we obtain a quote for the matching EuWax option without EuRex competition
such that the time diﬀerence between the two EuWax quotes is minimized. We apply the same
ﬁltering procedures and compute daily averages as in the previous section resulting in 53,607 daily
observations of EuWax-EuWax matches. DAX, Euro Stoxx 50, and Siemens put options are excluded
as they have fewer than 50 daily observations. This reduces the number of observations to 53,509.
Next, we compute averages by underlying asset and option type, forming nine groups. As shown
24in Table 13, the time diﬀerence between quotes is somewhat larger than in the other two matching
procedures, but is still close to two minutes at 146 seconds. The ratio of volume for EuWax options
without EuRex competition to volume for EuWax options with EuRex competition is close to one
in all groups. Similarly, the ask ratio is larger than one in all groups except one, which would again
bias us against ﬁnding lower bid-ask spreads for EuWax options with EuRex competition.
In four out of nine groups, bid-ask spreads for EuWax options with EuRex competition are
signiﬁcantly (1% level) lower than the bid-ask spreads of their EuWax matches without EuRex
competition. While there are also four groups for which the relation is signiﬁcant (5% level or better)
and reversed, the magnitude of the spread diﬀerences is considerably larger for the cases that have
the expected relation. In the cases in which the EuWax spreads of options with EuRex competition
are lower, the diﬀerence ranges from 0.8% to 4.9%. On the other hand, the largest diﬀerence in the
reversed case is only 0.9%. The average bid-ask spread diﬀerence across all groups is lower for EuWax
options with EuRex competition at 0.6%. As mentioned previously, due to minimum tick sizes the
results are biased against ﬁnding lower spreads for EuWax options with EuRex competitions, since
they are lower-priced on average. Thus, we recompute all tests (results not shown) using only daily
observations for which the diﬀerence of the ask prices is less than 50% of the ask price for the option
with competition. For the price-matched sample, we ﬁnd that in seven out of eight groups (across
underlying asset and type) with more than 50 observations, bid-ask spreads are lower for EuWax
options with competition and are signiﬁcant at the 1% level or better. Thus, while the results are
slightly weaker for EuWax options than EuRex options, the evidence is generally supportive of the
idea that EuRex competition has a positive eﬀect on the liquidity of EuWax options.
5. Conclusion
Option market structure matters. This paper analyzes two option markets with fundamentally
diﬀerent structures existing side-by-side and competing by oﬀering options with identical or similar
characteristics. We provide a comprehensive empirical comparison of bank-issued option markets
and traditional derivatives exchanges and show that quotes and the resulting bid-ask spreads diﬀer
substantially between the two market types. The EuWax market which has smaller overall volume
is shown to have smaller bid-ask spreads indicating that trading volume and bid-ask spreads may be
less closely connected in derivatives markets than in primary asset markets. A potential explanation
for the co-existence of the two market structures is oﬀered which is based on diﬀerences in investors’
motives for buying options. Finally, the evidence shows that competition between the two market
25t y p e si sb e n e ﬁcial to investors in that options with competition from the other market have smaller
bid-ask spreads than otherwise comparable options without competition.
The results may be of importance for regulators and practitioners. Current discussions sur-
rounding a pan-European regulatory “securities passport” may consider bank-issued option regula-
tion along the lines of the German model. Similarly, it appears that the creation of bank-issued
option markets in the U.S. via less onerous regulation comparable to the European model could help
serve option investors with a high probability of early liquidation, and, if nothing else, may improve
the quality of existing markets such as the CBOE due to competition. An alternative explanation
for the absence of bank-issued option markets in the U.S. is the possibility that traditional U.S. op-
tion exchanges serve all investors suﬃciently well to eliminate the need for alternative option market
structures.
Several avenues for future research remain. For one, other measures of liquidity/market-making
quality, such as quoted depth, could be considered for a comparison of the two markets. With respect
to quoted depth, one might expect that the EuRex market will be deeper than the EuWax market,
since depth is less of a concern for smaller investors using the EuWax market. Bank-issued option
markets also allow researchers an indirect look at option demand functions, since issuers are free to
choose option characteristics that they expect to have high demand from investors. In particular,
issuance can be studied dynamically to investigate how it responds to events in the underlying asset
markets (e.g., issuing put options after large underlying asset price drops) and the markets for already
existing derivative securities. Similarly, there may be dynamic interaction among issuers and markets
with respect to both issuance and market-making behavior. This seems particularly interesting in
light of the fact that many bank option issuers are also exchange-issued option market makers in the
case of EuRex and EuWax.
26Appendix
In this appendix, we formally derive the probability of early liquidation cut-oﬀ (PELC) employed in
the empirical work. We model the decision of option buyers faced with two option markets exhibiting
stylized facts similar to EuRex and EuWax. This section does not provide a full equilibrium analysis
of how bid and ask quotes are determined in the two markets. Rather we ask the question as to how
an investor would choose if faced with two markets exhibiting the empirically observed bid and ask
quote relations.
Consider the problem of an investor who wants to buy a European option and chooses between
two markets, R and W, in a two-period discrete-time setup, in which market W does not allow
investors to write options. Let AR
t and BR
t stand for market R’s ask and bid prices at time t,a n d
let AW
t and BW
t stand for market W’s ask and bid prices at time t, respectively. We assume that all
market participants agree on the value of the option Vt which conforms to the following conditions:
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t ≥ Vt ≥ B
R


















t for t = T =2 , (3)
where T is the option’s expiration date, and It is the option’s intrinsic value. Equation (1) states that
in market R, which does not have a short-sale restriction, investors cannot sell the option for more
than its true value nor buy the option for less than its true value. Only the latter condition holds in
market W as stated in equation (2). On the other hand, in market W we allow cases in which bid
prices may be higher than the option’s value as investors cannot exploit this apparent mispricing due
to the short-sale constraint. The third condition reﬂects that the option is worth its intrinsic value
at expiration. The subsequent analysis is also valid for American options if we impose the additional
assumption that all bid prices will be higher than the intrinsic value before maturity.
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t for t =0 ,1. (4)
Ask prices in market W cannot be less than bid prices in market R, as this would give rise to an
arbitrage opportunity in which investors could write an option in market R resulting in proceeds of
BR a n dh e d g et h er e s u l t i n ge x p o s u r eb yb u y i n ga no p t i o ni nm a r k e tW at a cost of AW.O n t h e
other hand, a comparable no-arbitrage condition does not exist in the other direction in the sense
that ask prices in market R can be less than bid prices in market W. Investors cannot exploit such
a situation as it would require writing options in market W, which is not allowed.
27Now consider the problem of an investor who has probability P of liquidating the option position
at time t = 1. The expected transaction costs (arising from bid-ask spreads) E0 [C] of options from





























where r is a discount rate used to obtain the present value of future transaction costs. The investor





















At time t = 0, an option investor who knows with certainty that the option will be held until maturity
should always purchase the option with the cheaper ask price. If P = 0 for all investors, and if one
ask price is consistently lower than the other, the non-preferred market will eventually vanish or
should not exist at all. The problem is also trivial (choose the option with the lower ask price today)
for the case in which the option with the lower ask price today is also expected to have higher bid
prices in the future. Again, if this condition holds consistently, the non-preferred market should not
exist.
A more interesting case occurs if one market consistently exhibits higher ask prices and higher
bid prices. In this case, an investor with a positive probability of early liquidation may choose an
option with a higher ask price today if he expects that the option will also have a higher bid price in
the future when the option position is liquidated. Rearranging (6) gives a minimum probability P ∗













P ∗ divides option buyers into two clienteles. Option buyers with P<P ∗ buy options in the
market exhibiting lower ask prices, while option buyers with P>P ∗ buy options in the market
exhibiting higher ask prices. Equation (7) also shows that the expected future bid price diﬀerence
should be higher than today’s ask price diﬀerence. This implication is due to two eﬀects. First, the
future bid price diﬀerence is reduced by the time value of money. Secondly, the expected bid price
diﬀerence is earned only with probability P, which may be smaller than one, while the ask price
diﬀerence is incurred with certainty if the more expensive option is purchased today.
To implement an empirical measure of P∗, we use the observed ask ratios and bid ratios to
construct a measure of the implied probability of early liquidation at which investors are divided
into EuRex and EuWax clients. The empirical measure makes two simpliﬁcations in that it ignores
28the eﬀect of the time value of money by setting r = 0. Furthermore, it uses the current bid ratio as
a measure of the investor’s expected bid ratio. The interpretation of the resulting measure is such
that all investors with a higher probability than this cut-oﬀ value select EuWax, while all investors
with a lower probability than this cut-oﬀ value select EuRex. We construct the probability of early
liquidation cut-oﬀ (PELC) as follows.
PELC =

      










Case 1: BR > AR > 1
Case 2: BR > 1 >A R
Case 3: 1 >B R>A R
Case 4: AR > BR > 1
Case 5: 1 >A R>B R
Case 6: AR > 1 >B R
(8)
where AR is the ratio of EuWax ask to EuRex ask and BR is the ratio of EuWax bid to EuRex bid.
Cases 1 through 6 above correspond directly to cases 1 through 6 reported in the univariate results in
Table 5.21 As shown in the univariate results, the ﬁrst case in the above equation is by far the most
frequent, whereby EuWax ask and bid prices are higher with the bid price diﬀerence being larger than
t h ea s kp r i c ed i ﬀerence. Under the above assumptions, the expression for the ﬁrst case is equivalent
to the theoretical result in equation (7). Cases 2 and 3 (cases 4 and 6) are situations in which all
investors irrespective of their probability of early liquidation prefer EuWax (EuRex) and we set the
cut-oﬀ value to zero (one). Case 5 has both lower bid and ask prices on EuWax. In this situation
investors, initially save money by buying EuWax options, but may loose even more money later on
if the option is liquidated. However, the initial savings are certain while the losses are only incurred
with the probability of early liquidation. Unlike case 1, it would be investors with a probability of
early liquidation below rather than above a certain threshold who prefer EuWax in this last case.
W ee x c l u d et h i sc a s ef r o mt h ee m p i r i c a la n a l y s i sa si ti su n c l e a rh o wt oc o m b i n ei t sP E L Cm e a s u r e
with the other cases. The excluded case represents fewer than .5% of the monthly observations.
21 As in the univariate analysis, we exclude situations where either ratio equals one.
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Figure 2. One-Way vs. Round-Trip Transaction Costs with Short-Sale Constraint in Market W
32Table 1: Institutional Diﬀerences between EuRex and EuWax
The table shows institutional diﬀerences between the EuRex and EuWax option markets.
Feature EuRex EuWax
Counterparty Central Diﬀerent Issuers
Market-Making Several Competing Issuer as Predominant
Market Makers Market Maker
Shorting Possible Not Possible
Market-Making Guarantees Same for All Market Makers Vary by Issuer
(e.g., trade size, depth)
Contract Design Standardized Chosen by Issuer
Creation of New Contracts Governed by Rules At Issuer’s Discretion
33Table 2: Market Activity in the EuRex and EuWax Option Markets
The table shows the number of EuRex market makers/EuWax issuers, underlying assets, average time to expiration
(in days), and the mean, median, and standard deviation of the number of option contracts for EuWax and EuRex
options during the period from May 1, 1999, to October 31, 2001. Contract numbers are shown by option type, issuer,
underlying asset, and expiration date. Data on option characteristics are from EuWax, EuRex, and OnVista.
EuRex EuWax
Call Put Call Put
Market Makers / Issuers 42 42 23 20
Underlying Assets 128 128 828 431
Mean 28 28 142 67
Underlying Assets per Market Maker / Issuer Median 16 16 132 44
St. Dev. 30 30 110 55
American 28,434 28,431 30,724 6,064
Option Contracts European 5,356 5,356 392 68
Total 33,790 33,787 31,116 6,132
Mean 1,353 307
Option Contracts per Issuer Median 1,214 299
St. Dev. 1,173 265
Mean 264 264 38 14
Option Contracts per Underlying Asset Median 224 224 8 3
St. Dev. 222 222 94 51
Mean 18.5 18.5 10.9 6.2
Expiration Dates per Underlying Asset Median 20.5 20.5 4.0 3.0
St. Dev. 7.8 7.8 17.2 9.5
Mean 3.2 2.2
Expiration Dates per Underlying Asset, Issuer Median 2.0 2.0
St. Dev. 2.7 1.5
Mean 152 152 453 409
Time to Expiration (in days) Median 88 88 455 416
St. Dev. 153 153 154 159
Mean 14.3 14.3 3.2 2.1
Strike Prices per Underlying, Expiration Date, Issuer Median 10.0 10.0 2.0 1.0
St. Dev. 12.2 12.2 3.1 2.7
34Table 3: Summary Statistics for Competing EuRex and EuWax Options
The table shows the number of observations, absolute value of expiration date di®erence, annual trading volume (in million Euro million paid premia), strike price
(mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum), time to expiration of the EuRex option in days (mean, minimum, maximum), contract size, EuWax minimum
trade size, and ratio of EuWax and EuRex trade size for a sample of matched pairs of EuRex and EuWax options during the year 2000. Match category 1 has
the same underlying asset, type, strike price, expiration date, style. Category 2 is as catetgory 1 except § 7 days expiration date di®erence. Category 3 is as
category 2 except di®erence in style is allowed for index call options. All numbers are means unless indicated otherwise. Underlying assets are: Deutsche Bank,
Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche Telekom, DAX index, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, and Siemens. Simple and observation-weighted averages are shown in the last
two columns. Data on option characteristics and volume are from EuWax, EuRex, and OnVista.
Deutsche Bank Daimler Chrysler Deutsche Telekom Siemens DAX Euro Stoxx 50 All Weighted
Call Put Call Put Call Put Call Put Call Put Call Put
Observations Total 191 30 189 47 224 44 280 48 1,010 4 279 15 2,361
Category 1 28 4 22 8 38 3 45 7 4 4 21 15 199
Category 2 163 26 167 39 186 41 235 41 898
Category 3 1,006 258 1,264
Exp. Date Di®erence 3.4 3.2 3.4 3.0 3.6 3.3 3.6 3.2 2.4 0 1.7 0 2.6 2.8
EuRex Volume 1,419 194 445 441 1,502 487 1,310 153 7,307 14 5,261 581 1,593 4,223
EuWax Volume 108 4 340 5 264 37 521 17 4,059 64 60 0 456 1,867
Strike Mean 93 81 73 69 60 53 142 116 7,143 7,100 4,842 4,373 2,012
Standard Deviation 17 12 18 17 24 15 40 35 1,125 115 900 555 239
Mininum 50 60 40 40 26 26 60 60 4,000 7,000 3,000 3,200 1,464
Maximum 140 100 120 100 140 80 250 180 10,000 7,200 7,000 7,000 2,526
Time to Mean 240 267 266 208 262 207 230 254 165 315 184 318 243 203
Expiration Minimum 14 49 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 268 14 275 14 14
Maximum 730 730 730 676 721 697 730 730 718 367 704 420 730 730
EuRex Contract Size 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 5 5 10 10 69 48
EuWax Contract Size .21 .19 .18 .16 .25 .34 .24 .13 .01 .01 .01 .01 .14 .10
EuWax Trade Size 24 33 29 29 33 43 36 31 37 1 53 80 36 37
Relative Size 5% 6% 5% 5% 8% 15% 9% 4% 7% 0% 3% 7% 6% 6%
35Table 4: Univariate Results for Matched EuRex and EuWax Options
The table shows the type (call or put), underlying asset (Deutsche Bank, Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche Telekom, DAX
index, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, and Siemens), match category, number of daily observations, number of
quote pairs, average time diﬀerence, average ratio of ask prices, average ratio of bid prices, implied early liquidation
probability, and average bid-ask spread (ratio of (ask minus bid) to ask) for a sample of matched quote pairs of
EuRex and EuWax options during the year 2000. Match category 1 has the same underlying asset, type, strike price,
expiration date, style. Category 2 is as category 1 except ± 7d a y se x p i r a t i o nd a t ed i ﬀerence. Category 3 is as
category 2 except diﬀerence in style is allowed for index call options. The match categories are mutually exclusive.
Averages are calculated by ﬁrst computing daily averages of observed quotes for each EuRex-EuWax option pair. The
daily observations are then averaged by underlying asset, type, and match category. T-tests are computed for ask
ratio (diﬀerent from 1), bid ratio (diﬀerent from 1), diﬀerence of ask ratio and bid ratio (diﬀerent from 0), and the
diﬀerence of the bid-ask spreads (diﬀerent from 0). Insigniﬁcant t-tests (p-value > 5%) are indicated with #. Simple
and daily-observation-weighted averages of all measures are computed across all options in the sample. Data on option
characteristics are from EuWax, EuRex, and OnVista. Quote data are from EuWax and KKMDB.
Underlying Type Match Daily Quote Time EuWax / EuRex Diﬀ.B A S p r e a d
Asset Cat. Obs. Pairs Diﬀ. Ask Bid t-Stat. EuRex EuWax
Deutsche Call 1 1,075 28,952 1:20 1.061 1.133 14.7 10.6% 4.86%
Bank 2 7,979 196,781 1:13 1.021 1.086 49.1 8.2% 2.5%
Put 1 27 401 1:33 1.065 1.104 2.2 #12.4% #9.0%
2 1,122 12,174 1:32 1.033 1.108 16.0 12.6% 6.2%
Daimler Call 1 583 7,054 1:29 1.080 1.142 7.5 15.3% 10.5%
Chrysler 2 7,219 76,358 1:35 1.090 1.164 31.8 13.8% 8.1%
Put 1 162 2,818 1:15 #.998 1.050 6.2 9.4% 4.8%
2 2,790 26,874 1:28 1.043 1.103 24.8 7.3% 2.2%
Deutsche Call 1 1,291 33,894 1:18 1.068 1.152 18.1 13.7% 7.0%
Telekom 2 8,044 164,835 1:16 1.040 1.119 42.2 12.5% 6.2%
Put 1 46 1,915 1:06 1.013 1.055 4.6 9.3% 5.5%
2 2,857 111,250 1:04 1.020 1.077 27.5 7.3% 2.3%
DAX Call 1 63 201 0:50 1.023 1.074 6.4 5.0% .3%
3 43,069 1,903,803 0:39 1.050 1.090 66.8 4.6% 1.1%
Put 1 47 303 0:38 1.020 1.048 2.7 2.9% .2%
Euro Call 1 79 1,609 1:09 .975 #1.005 2.6 6.0% 3.2%
Stoxx 50 3 7,500 212,871 1:08 1.050 1.088 29.4 6.5% 3.1%
Put 1 55 1,363 0:58 .962 .982 2.3 4.8% 2.8%
Siemens Call 1 943 14,815 1:15 1.018 1.068 12.9 8.0% 3.8%
2 9,399 103,898 1:09 1.037 1.084 34.9 6.1% 2.1%
Put 1 45 1,099 1:22 1.047 1.126 6.6 9.3% 2.6%
2 1,171 11,247 1:20 1.054 1.104 12.7 7.5% 3.2%
All 95,566 2,914,515 1:13 1.035 1.089 8.8% 4.2%
All (Weighted) 95,566 2,914,515 0:59 1.047 1.099 7.1% 2.8%
36Table 5: Univariate Results for Matched EuRex and EuWax Options by Quote Relation
The table shows the type (call or put), underlying asset (Deutsche Bank, Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche Telekom, DAX index, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index,
and Siemens), match category, share of observations (in %), average ratio of ask prices (AR), average ratio of bid prices (BR), for a sample of matched quote
pairs of EuRex and EuWax options during the year 2000. Match category 1 has the same underlying asset, type, strike price, expiration date, style. Category
2 is as category 1 except § 7 days expiration date di®erence. Category 3 is as category 2 except di®erence in style is allowed for index call options. The match
categories are mutually exclusive. Quote pairs are categorized into six groups according to the ratio of ask prices and the ratio of bid prices (observations with
either ratio equal one are excluded). Averages of all observed quote pairs are computed across underlying, type, match category, and ratio category. Data on
option characteristics are from EuWax, EuRex, and OnVista. Quote data are from EuWax and KKMDB.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
BR > AR > 1 BR > 1 > AR 1 > BR > AR AR > BR > 1 1 > AR > BR AR > 1 > BR
Under- Type Match % Ask Bid % Ask Bid % Ask Bid % Ask Bid % Ask Bid % Ask Bid
lying Cat. Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio
Deutsche Call 1 67 1.09 1.17 29 0.97 1.04 1 0.95 0.97 1 1.17 1.14 1 0.91 0.83 0 1.05 0.95
Bank 2 52 1.06 1.14 42 0.98 1.04 6 0.93 0.97 0 1.14 1.12 1 0.83 0.80 0 1.02 0.97
Put 1 100 1.04 1.11 0 0 0 0 0
2 62 1.07 1.15 31 0.97 1.06 6 0.87 0.93 1 1.14 1.11 0 0.92 0.90 0 1.06 0.96
Daimler Call 1 80 1.10 1.19 19 0.90 1.14 0 1 1.13 1.11 1 0.78 0.67 0
Chrysler 2 74 1.09 1.17 20 0.96 1.09 3 0.88 0.95 2 1.17 1.13 1 0.88 0.84 0 1.04 0.98
Put 1 37 1.03 1.08 54 0.98 1.03 8 0.82 0.84 1 1.04 1.03 0 0
2 63 1.06 1.11 32 0.98 1.03 4 0.88 0.91 0 1.08 1.07 1 0.93 0.92 0 1.02 0.97
Deutsche Call 1 67 1.10 1.20 21 0.96 1.08 5 0.90 0.95 4 1.19 1.11 1 0.96 0.91 1 1.09 0.91
Telekom 2 60 1.09 1.18 28 0.96 1.07 8 0.91 0.96 2 1.12 1.09 1 0.88 0.82 1 1.09 0.89
Put 1 52 1.04 1.09 43 0.98 1.02 4 0.96 1.00 0 0 0
2 46 1.04 1.11 48 0.98 1.04 6 0.97 0.99 0 1.15 1.14 0 0.98 0.97 0 1.00 0.99
DAX Call 1 65 1.05 1.10 30 0.98 1.04 5 0.95 0.98 0 0 0
3 82 1.06 1.11 16 0.99 1.02 2 0.97 0.98 0 1.25 1.19 0 0.91 0.85 0 1.19 0.89
Put 1 65 1.04 1.07 28 0.99 1.01 7 0.96 0.99 0 0 0
Euro Call 1 54 1.02 1.06 9 1.00 1.02 33 0.91 0.93 0 4 0.84 0.83 0
Stoxx 50 3 78 1.06 1.10 14 0.99 1.03 4 0.96 0.98 3 1.23 1.17 0 0.91 0.86 0 1.09 0.92
Put 1 11 1.01 1.03 39 0.99 1.01 50 0.94 0.95 0 0 0
Siemens Call 1 48 1.07 1.12 31 0.97 1.04 12 0.92 0.96 7 1.11 1.09 1 0.90 0.82 0
2 63 1.07 1.12 29 0.98 1.03 6 0.94 0.96 1 1.11 1.07 1 0.93 0.90 1 1.04 0.94
Put 1 89 1.05 1.12 11 0.99 1.09 0 0 0 0
2 72 1.08 1.13 21 0.98 1.04 4 0.95 0.98 1 1.16 1.09 1 0.88 0.84 1 1.09 0.92
Average 63 1.06 1.12 27 0.98 1.05 7.7 0.92 0.96 1.2 1.15 1.11 0.5 0.89 0.85 0.2 1.06 0.94
37Table 6: Summary Statistics for Multivariate Analysis of Matched EuRex and EuWax Options
The table shows sample mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of quotes per month, match category,
absolute value of expiration date diﬀerence, ratio of ask prices, ratio of bid prices, number of competing EuWax
options, ratio of minimum trade size, EuWax maximum bid-ask spread (in Euros), a dummy equal to one for EuWax
issuer being a EuRex Market-Maker for the same underlying asset, annualized standard deviation of underlying asset
returns during the observation month, time to expiration (in days) of the EuRex option, and moneyness. The sample
contains matched quote pairs of EuRex and EuWax options on the following underlying assets: Deutsche Bank,
Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche Telekom, DAX index, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, and Siemens. Match category 1
has the same underlying asset, type, strike price, expiration date, style. Category 2 is as category 1 except ± 7d a y s
expiration date diﬀerence. Category 3 is as category 2 except diﬀerence in style is allowed for index call options. The
match categories are mutually exclusive. Number of observations is shown by option type and underlying asset. For
the ask and bid ratios, monthly averages are calculated from all observed quotes during the observation month for each
EuRex-EuWax option pair. For time to expiration and moneyness, data are calculated daily and then averaged across
all observations during the month. Data on option characteristics are from EuWax, EuRex, and OnVista. Quote data
are from EuWax and KKMDB. Daily data on underlying asset returns and prices are from Datastream. All data is
monthly. Sample period is the year 2000.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Quotes / Month 355 628 1 6,666
Match Category 2.5 0.6 1 3
Abs (Expiration Date Diﬀerence) 3.1 2.3 0 7
EuWax Ask / EuRex Ask 1.05 0.09 0.56 1.48
EuWax Bid / EuRex Bid 1.09 0.11 0.54 1.50
# Competing EuWax Options 2.7 1.6 1 8
Minimum Trade Size: EuWax / EuRex 2.6% 5.7% 0.0% 50.0%
EuWax Maximum Euro Spread 0.17 0.50 0.02 5
EuWax Issuer = EuRex Market Maker (=1) 0.59 0.49 0 1
Underlying Asset Standard Deviation 32% 14% 11% 77%
Time to Expiration 221 155 14 730
Moneyness 102% 26% 37% 347%




-P u t s 6 7 4
-D e u t s c h eB a n k 8 0 8
- Daimler Chrysler 892
- Deutsche Telekom 931
-D A X 3 , 4 4 4
- Euro Stoxx 50 915
-S i e m e n s 1 , 1 9 5
38Table 7: Multivariate Results for Matched EuRex and EuWax Options
The table shows the coeﬃcient estimate, t-statistic, number of observations, and adjusted ﬁt for regressions of the
ratio of ask prices on the ratio of bid prices, number of competing EuWax options, annualized standard deviation
of underlying asset returns during the observation month, option type, time to expiration (in days) of the EuRex
option, moneyness, a dummy (=1 for EuWax issuer being a EuRex Market-Maker for the matched option), EuWax
maximum bid-ask spread (in Euros), ratio of minimum trade size, underlying asset dummies, and issuer dummies. The
sample contains matched quote pairs of EuRex and EuWax options on the following underlying assets: Deutsche Bank,
Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche Telekom, DAX index, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, Siemens. Match category 1 has the
same underlying asset, type, strike, exp. date, style. Category 2 is as category 1 except ± 7d a y se x p .d a t ed i ﬀerence.
Category 3 is as category 2 except diﬀerence in style is allowed for index call options. The match categories are
mutually exclusive. For the ask and bid ratios, monthly averages are calculated from all quotes during the observation
month for each EuRex-EuWax pair. For time to expiration and moneyness, data are calculated daily and averaged
over all observations during the month. Data on option characteristics are from EuWax, EuRex, and OnVista. Quote
data are from EuWax, KKMDB. Daily data on underlying asset returns and prices are from Datastream. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and ﬁrst-order serial correlation. All data is monthly. Sample period is the year
2000.
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
Variable Coeﬀ. t-Stat. Coeﬀ.t - S t a t .C o e ﬀ.t - S t a t .
Intercept .32 22.7 .32 21.1 .31 12.4
EuWax Bid / EuRex Bid .69 37.1 .68 36.3 .69 22.8
# Competing EuWax Options -.0027 -7.5 -.0027 -7.3 -.0048 -7.7
Underlying Asset Standard Deviation -.043 -10.8 -.030 -4.3 -.047 -4.9
Type (Put = 1) -.0085 -3.6 -.0047 -1.7 -.0086 -3.2
Time to Expiration -2.4E-05 -4.8 -1.9E-05 -3.6 9.0E-06 1.1
Moneyness .0055 0.6 .014 1.7 .0015 0.1
EuWax Issuer = EuRex Market Maker (=1) -.00029 -0.2
EuWax Maximum Euro Spread -.0059 -3.8
Minimum Trade Size: EuWax / EuRex -.12 -4.6
Deutsche Bank -.019 -10.6 -.014 -6.0
Daimler Chrysler -.0031 -0.9 -.0051 -1.2
Deutsche Telekom -1.2E-02 -3.5 -.0076 -2.0
Euro Stoxx 50 -5.0E-05 0.0 -.015 -4.9
Siemens .0028 1.2 .0033 1.2
Banque Nationale de Paris Paribas -.0098 -2.8 -.011 -3.1
Credit Lyonnais .028 2.5 .057 4.1
Commerzbank .0071 3.2 .0074 2.0
Deutsche Bank .00088 0.5 .0023 1.0
DG Bank .0040 2.2 .024 5.7
Dresdner Bank -.0069 -2.0 -.0043 -1.2
Goldman Sachs -.0013 -0.2 -.00062 -0.1
HypoVereinsBank -.00058 -0.2 .0063 1.5
Lehman Brothers -.0076 -1.1 .0062 0.8
Merrill Lynch .0059 0.6 .019 1.9
RaboBank .034 3.7 .027 4.9
Societe Generale .0075 3.7 .029 7.3
Sal. Oppenheim -.023 -7.2 -.025 -6.1
HSBC Trinkaus Burkhardt -.0023 -1.3 -.0023 -0.8
UBS Warburg -.0063 -2.2 .0045 0.9
Unicredito Italiano -.018 -3.1 .0049 0.8
Westdeutsche Landesbank -.0070 -1.2 .021 2.8
Observations 8,185 8,185 3,801
Adj. R2 73.1% 74.8% 74.8%
39Table 8: Time-Series Variation in Ask Ratios
The table shows the time to expiration coeﬃcient estimate and t-statistic, estimated eﬀect of a 1-month change in
time to expiration on ask ratios, and number of observations for regressions of the ratio of ask prices on the ratio of
bid prices, number of competing EuWax options, annualized standard deviation of underlying asset returns during
the observation month, option type, time to expiration (in days) of the EuRex option, moneyness, a dummy (=1 for
EuWax issuer being a EuRex Market-Maker for the matched option), EuWax maximum bid-ask spread (in Euros),
ratio of minimum trade size, underlying asset dummies, and issuer dummies. The sample contains matched quote
pairs of EuRex and EuWax options on the following underlying assets: Deutsche Bank, Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche
Telekom, DAX index, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, Siemens. Match category 1 has the same underlying asset, type,
strike, exp. date, style. Category 2 is as category 1 except ± 7d a y se x p .d a t ed i ﬀerence. Category 3 is as category 2
except diﬀerence in style is allowed for index call options. The match categories are mutually exclusive. For the ask
and bid ratios, monthly averages are calculated from all quotes during the observation month for each EuRex-EuWax
pair. For time to expiration and moneyness, data are calculated daily, and averaged over all observations during the
month. The sample is split by EuRex expiration dates. Data on option characteristics are from EuWax, EuRex,
and OnVista. Quote data are from EuWax, KKMDB. Daily data on underlying asset returns and prices are from
Datastream. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and ﬁrst-order serial correlation. All data is monthly.
Sample period is the year 2000.
EuRex Speciﬁcation
Expiration Date 1 2 3
March 16, 2001 Time to Expiration 1.1E-04 9.8E-05 1.1E-04
t-Statistic 2.1 3.8 3.7
1-Month Eﬀect 0.34% 0.30% 0.34%
Observations 909 909 909
June 15, 2001 Time to Expiration 7.1E-05 6.7E-05 6.9E-05
t-Statistic 5.7 5.5 5.4
1-Month Eﬀect 0.21% 0.20% 0.21%
Observations 1,491 1,491 1,482
September 21, 2001 Time to Expiration 1.6E-04 1.7E-04 1.7E-04
t-Statistic 3.5 3.0 3.9
1-Month Eﬀect 0.48% 0.50% 0.51%
Observations 418 418 408
December 21, 2001 Time to Expiration 9.8E-05 9.0E-05 9.6E-05
t-Statistic 4.0 4.5 3.9
1-Month Eﬀect 0.29% 0.27% 0.29%
Observations 759 759 747
June 21, 2002 Time to Expiration 3.1E-04 3.1E-04 3.0E-04
t-Statistic 3.8 4.1 3.8
1-Month Eﬀect 0.92% 0.93% 0.90%
Observations 255 255 255
40Table 9: Probability of Early Liquidation
The table shows the coeﬃcient estimate, t-statistic, mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, number of ob-
servations, and adjusted ﬁt for a regression of probability of early liquidation cut-oﬀ (PELC) on the option omega,
ratio of option vega to EuWax ask, option type, time to expiration (in days) of the EuWax option. The sample con-
tains matched quote pairs of EuRex and EuWax options on the following underlying assets: Deutsche Bank, Daimler
Chrysler, Deutsche Telekom, DAX index, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, Siemens. Match category 1 has the same
underlying asset, type, strike, exp. date, style. Category 2 is as category 1 except ± 7d a y se x p .d a t ed i ﬀerence. Cat-
egory 3 is as category 2 except diﬀerence in style is allowed for index call options. The match categories are mutually
exclusive. PELC is computed from ask ratios and bid ratios. Omega is computed as delta times the ratio of the value
of the underlying asset to the EuWax ask price. Omega, vega, time to expiration, underlying asset value, and EuWax
ask price are calculated daily and averaged over all observations during the month. Data on option characteristics
and volume are from EuWax, EuRex, and OnVista. Quote data are from EuWax, KKMDB. Daily data on underlying
asset returns and prices are from Datastream. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and ﬁrst-order serial
correlation. All data is monthly. Sample period is the year 2000.
Variable Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Intercept .164 17.7
Omega .007 6.2 6.9 6.3 .8 80.1
Vega / EuWax Ask 1.842 14.3 .038 .047 0 .527
Type (Put = 1) -0.033 -2.8 0.08 0.27 0 1
Time to Expiration 4.9E-04 20.1 224 156 14 730
Observations 7,775
Adj. R2 23.9%
41Table 10: Eﬀective Spreads for Matched EuRex and EuWax Options
The table shows the type (call or put), underlying asset (Deutsche Bank, Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche Telekom, DAX
index, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, and Siemens), match category, number of observations, average time diﬀerence,
average quoted bid-ask spread (ratio of (ask minus bid) to ask), average eﬀective bid-ask spread (ratio of absolute
diﬀerence between transaction price and mid quote to ask price times two), and share of inside-the-quote transaction
prices for a sample of matched quote/transaction pairs of EuRex and EuWax options during the year 2000. Match
category 1 has the same underlying asset, type, strike price, expiration date, style. Category 2 is as category 1 except
± 7 days expiration date diﬀerence. Category 3 is as category 2 except diﬀerence in style is allowed for index call
options. The match categories are mutually exclusive. Simple and daily-observation-weighted averages of all measures
are computed across all options in the sample. Data on option characteristics are from EuWax, EuRex, and OnVista.
Quote and transaction data are from EuRex, EuWax and KKMDB.
Under- Type Match Obs. Time Diﬀerence Spread Share of
lying Cat. Trans- Trans./Quote Quoted Eﬀective Inside Trans.
actions EuRex EuWax EuRex EuWax EuRex EuWax EuRex EuWax
Dt. Bank Call 2 39 24:28 01:55 03:21 8.8% 4.0% 4.9% 3.3% 71.8% 12.8%
Daimler Call 11 32 0 : 3 1 02:51 03:30 21.9% 10.9% 12.9% 8.0% 84.6% 23.1%
Chrysler 2 102 18:08 02:50 03:28 11.7% 8.3% 6.5% 6.3% 74.5% 8.8%
Put 2 172 0 : 14 02:48 04:15 9.5% 5.0% 5.6% 4.4% 64.7% 5.9%
Deutsche Call 11 92 1:49 03:43 03:17 10.7% 5.8% 5.6% 4.9% 73.7% 10.5%
Telekom 2 87 19:56 02:19 03:56 10.9% 7.2% 5.6% 4.9% 73.6% 26.4%
Put 2 22 24:23 03:07 04:211 1 .2% 10.1%6 . 8 % 5 . 1% 68.2% 63.6%
DAX Call 3 840 15:20 01:49 02:20 7.1%2 . 3 % 3 . 7 %1.6% 70.8% 23.3%
Euro Stoxx 50 Call 3 51 21:21 01:47 03:28 7.5% 4.0% 3.2% 3.6% 84.3% 3.9%
Siemens Call 2 61 20:03 01:46 03:22 12.1%4 . 0 % 7 . 1%3 . 1%7 5 . 4 % 16.4%
Put 2 100 8 : 2 5 0 1:32 03:02 5.6% 3.9% 4.0% 3.2% 70.0% 30.0%
All 1,2611 9:31 02:24 03:29 10.6% 5.9% 6.0% 4.4% 73.8% 20.4%
All (Weighted) 1,2611 6:57 02:00 02:46 8.3% 3.6% 4.4% 2.6% 72.2% 21.3%
42Table 11: Brokerage Costs for EuRex and EuWax Options
The table shows EuWax DAX index option price (in Euro), number of EuRex contracts, trade value (in Euros), EuRex
brokerage costs (in Euros), EuWax brokerage costs (in Euros), and the diﬀerence of EuWax and EuRex brokerage costs
as a percentage of the trade value for three brokerages, Comdirect, Consors, and Fimatex. Contract size for EuWax
and EuRex options is .01 Euros and 5 Euros per index point, respectively. Data on option characteristics are from
EuWax, EuRex, and OnVista. Quote data are from EuWax and KKMDB. Brokerage cost data are from Comdirect,
Consors, and Fimatex. Sample period is the year 2000.
Brokerage Costs
EuWax # EuRex Trade Comdirect Consors Fimatex
Price Contracts Value EuRex EuWax Diﬀ.E u R e x E u W a xD i ﬀ.E u R e xE u W a xD i ﬀ.
1 525 19 1 3.4% 20 10 1.8% 13 9 0.7%
1.05 10 5,250 45 11 0.7% 39 18 0.4% 50 9 0.8%
100 52,500 450 105 0.7% 275 69 0.4% 500 42 0.9%
1 2,380 19 5 0.6% 24 11 0.6% 13 9 0.1%
4.76 10 23,800 45 48 0.0% 131 65 0.3% 50 19 0.1%
100 238,000 450 476 0.0% 1,202 69 0.5% 500 47 0.2%
1 3,830 19 8 0.3% 31 15 0.4% 13 9 0.1%
7.66 10 38,300 45 77 -0.1% 204 69 0.4% 50 31 0.1%
100 383,000 450 766 -0.1% 1,927 69 0.5% 500 47 0.1%
1 9,505 19 19 0.0% 60 29 0.3% 13 9 0.0%
19.01 10 95,050 45 190 -0.2% 488 69 0.4% 50.0 47 0.0%
100 950,500 450 1,901 -0.2% 4,765 69 0.5% 500 47 0.0%
43Table 12: Eﬀect of EuWax Competition on EuRex Bid-Ask Spreads
The table shows the type (call or put), underlying asset (Deutsche Bank, Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche Telekom, DAX
index, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, and Siemens), number of daily observations, average time diﬀerence, average
volume ratio, average ratio of ask prices, average bid-ask spreads (ratio of (ask minus bid) to ask), and t-statistics for the
diﬀerence of the average bid-ask spreads for a sample of matched quote pairs of EuRex options with competition from
EuWax options and EuRex options without competition from EuWax options during the year 2000. EuRex-EuRex
quote pairs are generated by starting with a set of EuRex option quotes that have matching quotes from competing
EuWax options. The EuRex quotes are matched to EuRex quotes for options without EuWax competition such that
the matching EuRex option has the same type and underlying asset and comparable trading volume (as measured by
paid premiums) during each observation month. Averages are calculated by ﬁrst computing daily averages of observed
quotes for each EuRex-EuRex option pair. The daily observations are then averaged by underlying asset and type.
Simple and daily-observation-weighted averages of all measures are computed. Data on option characteristics are from
EuWax, EuRex, and OnVista. Quote data are from EuWax and KKMDB.
Underlying Type Daily Time No EuWax Comp. / Bid-Ask Spread
Asset Obs. Diﬀ. EuWax Comp. EuWax No EuWax t-Stat.
Volume Ask Comp. Comp.
Deutsche Bank Call 1,540 1:16 .98 1.3 9.6% 13.9% 10.3
Put 528 1:06 .99 4.0 14.6% 14.8% .4
Daimler Chrysler Call 1,608 1:19 1.00 2.3 18.3% 16.9% (2.7)
Put 1,051 1:24 .98 1.0 9.8% 11.4% 4.3
Deutsche Telekom Call 2,641 1:18 .99 2.5 14.9% 14.7% (.5)
Put 1,420 1:13 .99 1.6 8.3% 10.2% 7.3
DAX Call 6,452 1:27 .99 2.4 6.9% 9.5% 15.4
Euro Stoxx 50 Call 1,957 1:17 .98 1.8 7.8% 7.9% 0.4
Siemens Call 1,549 1:33 .98 1.2 9.3% 12.5% 7.4
Put 337 1:33 .99 1.1 7.6% 14.2% 7.0
All 19,083 1:21 .99 1.9 10.7% 12.6%
All (Weighted) 19,083 1:22 .99 2.0 10.0% 11.7%
44Table 13: Eﬀect of EuRex Competition on EuWax Bid-Ask Spreads
The table shows the type (call or put), underlying asset (Deutsche Bank, Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche Telekom, DAX
index, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, and Siemens), number of daily observations, average time diﬀerence, average
volume ratio, average ratio of ask prices, average bid-ask spreads (ratio of (ask minus bid) to ask), and t-statistics for the
diﬀerence of the average bid-ask spreads for a sample of matched quote pairs of EuWax options with competition from
EuRex options and EuWax options without competition from EuRex options during the year 2000. EuWax-EuWax
quote pairs are generated by starting with a set of EuWax option quotes that have matching quotes from competing
EuRex options. The EuWax quotes are matched to EuWax quotes for options without EuRex competition such that
the matching EuWax option has the same type and underlying asset, and comparable trading volume (as measured by
paid premiums) during each observation month. Averages are calculated by ﬁrst computing daily averages of observed
quotes for each EuWax-EuWax option pair. The daily observations are then averaged by underlying asset and type.
Simple and daily-observation-weighted averages of all measures are computed. Data on option characteristics are from
EuWax, EuRex, and OnVista. Quote data are from EuWax and KKMDB.
Underlying Type Daily Time No EuRex Comp. / Bid-Ask Spread
Asset Obs. Diﬀ. EuRex Comp. EuRex No EuRex t-Stat.
Volume Ask Comp. Comp.
Deutsche Bank Call 6,763 2:26 .99 2.9 2.8% 1.9% (15.6)
Put 303 2:30 .96 9.3 5.7% 6.1% .5
Daimler Chrysler Call 4,751 2:28 .99 2.4 8.1% 7.7% (1.8)
Put 943 2:29 .99 2.1 2.5% 2.2% (3.7)
Deutsche Telekom Call 6,085 2:29 1.00 2.7 7.0% 6.4% (2.9)
Put 1,209 2:27 .99 .7 2.6% 7.5% 16.4
DAX Call 25,322 2:25 1.00 4.9 1.3% 2.2% 20.9
Euro Stoxx 50 Call 3,381 2:25 1.00 3.0 3.4% 7.2% 15.8
Siemens Call 4,752 2:28 1.00 2.4 2.8% 3.6% 6.5
All 53,509 2:28 .99 3.4 4.0% 5.0%
All (Weighted) 53,509 2:26 1.00 3.7 3.1% 3.7%
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